

88th Congress }  
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS  
IN THE SOVIET UNION

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A STUDY

SUBMITTED BY THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY  
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS

(Pursuant to S. Res. 13, 88th Cong.)

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

98865

WASHINGTON : 1968

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## FOREWORD

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In May 1962, the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations was established to review the administration of national security, and to make findings and proposals for improvement as appropriate.

Early in its inquiry, the subcommittee determined that it would be helpful to see how certain Communist bloc nations recruit and manage personnel in the making of national policy. The subcommittee staff, in cooperation with the executive branch, was asked to arrange for the preparation of the present study on staffing procedures and problems in the Soviet Union.

This study is a sequel and companion to the one entitled *National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union*, issued by the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery in January 1960.

The subcommittee believes that this publication will be of particular interest to officials of the government and to the academic community. It should help promote understanding of the Communist challenge to democratic societies and to individual liberty.

HENRY M. JACKSON,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on  
National Security Staffing  
and Operations.*

MAY 15, 1963.

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## STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET UNION

### INTRODUCTION

The signal importance of effective and orderly staffing procedures and criteria in the operation of the state has been recognized by Soviet leaders from very nearly the beginnings of Soviet power. The early Bolshevik view that any worker or housewife could easily handle the affairs of government was quickly discarded when the new regime in 1917 and 1918 sought to cope with the complexities of state administration. From that time the Soviet leaders have concentrated heavily on a search for more effective organization and functions and better training and deployment of personnel.

This study focuses on the machinery and procedures developed for staffing the posts concerned with the making and execution of policy in the area of Soviet global interests. It leans heavily on an earlier study of the Soviet system<sup>1</sup> which may be consulted for a fuller discussion of the Soviet policymaking machinery. The present study, however, is complete within itself, and brings up to date some of the material in the earlier study.

The following description of the state system of the U.S.S.R., taken from the earlier study, provides a useful preface.

The Soviet system is a dictatorship in which ultimate power is exercised by the leaders of the Communist Party. While the government apparatus is patterned after that of a Western political democracy, there is no system of checks and balances, and any concept of the separation of powers is definitively rejected. The functions of the government are dictated by the party, whose hegemony is explicitly acknowledged by the Constitution. The prerogative of the party to make state policy and supervise its implementation without direct popular controls or checks is unquestioned, and party influence and power pervade all phases of life from the lowliest private dwelling to the highest councils of state.

This description needs augmenting, however, for it omits the fact that the party no less than the government is under the dictatorial control of a self-perpetuating body of men who in a corporate sense are not answerable to any other group or force in Soviet society. Moreover, it suggests an alien-ruler role for the party, whereas in fact the party machinery is an integral part of the Soviet governing mechanism performing many functions that in the West are the normal prerogative and responsibility of government.

Party and government in the Soviet Union, though structurally separate, are actually part and parcel of a single state system. The

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. *National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union*. (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960), 75 pp.

party Presidium, formally a part of the party structure, is the governing head of the entire system, and its power and authority are exercised through its two executive-administrative arms, the government bureaucracy and the professional party machine. The Soviet state system, moreover, is a totalitarian system embracing virtually every activity in the country. Except for a few minor jobs, all positions—from minister to party clerk; from research scientist to streetsweeper; from party secretary to lathe operator—are parts of a single mammoth staff at the service of the Soviet rulers. Thus, the men who bear ultimate responsibility for the security of the Soviet Union have the full manpower resources of the country at their disposal. How these resources are organized and used in forwarding world Soviet interests is the central problem of this study.

Where possible an attempt has been made to relate the staffing procedures to the achievement of objectives in policymaking and administration and a few conclusions as to the effectiveness of the system have been hazarded. Chapter I attempts to give some idea of the scope of the staffing problem and an appreciation of the human resources available. Chapters II and III then take up the staffing machinery and the way in which it functions. Chapter IV presents an overall appraisal of the system and touches on a few special problems. An appendix deals with education and training programs for developing the talent, knowledge, and ability necessary to meet national needs.

## CHAPTER I. STAFFING RESOURCES

Official secrecy in the U.S.S.R. puts the Western student of Soviet politics and public administration at a great disadvantage. Practically nothing is being written in the Soviet Union, for instance, on how the governing organs of the party operate or how national policies are formulated. In this situation, there is no public discussion of staffing at the highest levels and one can only guess at what proportion of the manpower pool the Kremlin would consider critical for formulating and carrying out Kremlin global policies.

If they elected to speak on the question, however, the Soviet leaders would probably present a rather broad estimate of their manpower needs in this field. The fact that the entire administrative mechanism—political, military, industrial, etc.—is closely woven together at all levels and operates as a single system makes it difficult to determine at what point the staffing function loses its critical importance. Only a small portion of the total manpower pool however, is crucial. Soviet population figures will illustrate this point. (See Figure A.)

FIGURE A.—*Manpower Resources in the U.S.S.R., 1959*

	<i>Number of persons</i>
Total Labor Force.....	109, 100, 000
Workers and Peasants.....	88, 600, 000
Intelligentsia.....	20, 500, 000
of which:	
Managerial and Professional Personnel.....	7, 467, 000

It is within the intelligentsia category that the people essential for "national security" functions will almost certainly be found. However, the intelligentsia includes not only management and professional personnel but also technicians, secretaries, typists, sales and restaurant employees, barbers, and other white-collar workers. The notion of the intelligentsia as a highly select, tightly knit group of intellectuals—as was the case in Russia in the years before the Revolution—is now almost entirely gone.

Out of this category—the intelligentsia—it is possible to isolate 15 broad occupations in which about 7.5 million persons were employed in 1959. This group—the managerial and professional personnel—of course contains elements critical to national policy staffing. The occupations represented, all of which generally require a college education or its equivalent, encompass about one-third of the members of the intelligentsia and one-sixteenth of the total labor force. The occupations selected and the number of persons employed in each of them are shown in Figure B.

FIGURE B.—*Managerial and Professional Personnel in the U.S.S.R., 1959*

	Number of persons
Managerial and Professional Personnel (total).....	7, 467, 000
Managerial Personnel (total).....	2, 221, 600
Heads of state administrative organs and their structural sub- divisions.....	246, 600
Heads of Communist Party, Komsomol (Young Communist League), trade union, cooperative, and other social organiza- tions.....	145, 500
Directors of enterprises and their immediate subordinates (ex- cluding foremen) in industry, construction, transportation, communications, and agriculture.....	955, 200
Directors and managers in other sectors of the economy (exclud- ing health, education, and research).....	874, 300
Professional Personnel (total).....	5, 245, 400
Engineers.....	834, 300
Agronomists, zootechnicians, veterinarians, and foresters.....	367, 400
Physicians (including heads of hospitals).....	381, 900
Teachers (except in higher educational institutions).....	2, 519, 200
Scientific Personnel <sup>1</sup> .....	316, 400
Teachers in higher educational institutions.....	127, 400
Heads of scientific research establishments.....	32, 700
Other scientific personnel.....	156, 300
Writers, journalists, and editors.....	73, 100
Library heads and librarians.....	239, 000
Lectures, propagandists, and other "cultural-enlightenment" per- sonnel.....	47, 000
Judges, public prosecutors, and lawyers.....	36, 000
Marketing specialists.....	122, 800
Economists, planners, and statisticians.....	308, 300

<sup>1</sup> A Soviet occupational category that has no U.S. counterpart. Includes faculty members at higher educational institutions, heads of scientific-research establishments, and selected individuals from all fields of learning who are engaged in research and have been awarded the title "scientific worker" by the state.

The nucleus of leadership in the U.S.S.R. is provided by the 390,000 persons who direct the Soviet government, the Communist Party and the various auxiliary organizations—such as the trade unions and the youth group, the Komsomol. Within the party side, there are the Presidium, the Secretariat, and the administrative organs of the Central Committee. On the government side, there is the Council of Ministers with its various ministries, state committees, and chief directorates. Also to be included are the leading party and governmental offices at the republic and regional levels. At the next stage are the nearly two million directors and managers of individual enterprises, including those who head bureaus and branches within factories. Leading members of this group are often promoted into policymaking positions—to the Council of Ministers, for example.

The professional personnel listed in Figure B, numbering some 5.5 million in 1959, are those persons who through education, experience or a combination of both have mastered a critical specialty. This includes heads of scientific research establishments and other leading scientific personnel—groups having a particular bearing to this study; it also includes physicians, lawyers, teachers and librarians—occupations generally outside the area under discussion.

This information from official Soviet statistics helps in drawing an outline of the overall staffing problem but it falls far short of providing a yardstick of personnel needs in the fields most closely identified with Kremlin global policy operations. Assuming, however, that the areas



of critical need in the U.S.S.R. are similar to those in the United States, the following have been chosen for investigation in this study:

1. The organs of leadership (The party Presidium, the Secretariat, the Council of Ministers, etc.).
2. The Military High Command.
3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service.
4. The Intelligence Services.
5. The organizations for foreign trade and aid.
6. The major scientific research and development organizations.

Staffing needs in these six areas are probably somewhere in the order of half a million people.

There is, however, one aspect of the Soviet manpower situation outside this framework which has special interest for the future and should not be overlooked—the important role of employed women in Soviet society. A larger proportion of women is employed in the U.S.S.R. than in almost any other industrial country in the world. In 1959, for example, 76.4 percent of the females 16 through 54 years of age in the U.S.S.R. were in the labor force, compared with 42.2 percent in the United States.

The relatively high proportion of women among graduates of higher educational institutions in the U.S.S.R. during the last two decades led inevitably to an expansion of their role in the major professional occupations. By 1959 about 80 percent of Soviet physicians and almost 75 percent of teachers, economists, and planners were women. (See Figure C.)

FIGURE C.—*Proportion of Women in Selected Managerial Positions and Major Professional Occupations, January 1959*


Managerial positions:	Percent
Heads of government departments and their subdivisions.....	28
Heads of party, Komsomol, trade union, cooperative, and other social organizations and their subdivisions.....	21
Heads of enterprises (industrial, construction, agricultural, forestry, transportation, and communications) and their subdivisions.....	12
Chief physicians and other heads of medical establishments.....	52
School principals (except 4-year elementary schools).....	23
Heads of publishing houses and their subdivisions.....	24
Heads of trade organizations and stores.....	49
Heads of public dining enterprises.....	53
Heads of material and technical supply organizations.....	26
Professional occupations:	
Engineers.....	32
Agronomists.....	41
Physicians.....	79
Faculty of higher educational institutions (VUZ).....	38
Teachers (except VUZ).....	73
Lawyers.....	37
Economists and planners.....	74

They played a much smaller part, however, in managerial occupations than in the professional occupations from which the managers normally are drawn. Although women constitute 32 percent of all engineers, they hold only 12 percent of the high-level positions in industrial and other enterprises where almost all such positions are held by engineers. Similarly, women hold far fewer managerial posts in schools and hospitals than their relative numbers among teachers and doctors would dictate. Moreover, although women make up about one-fourth of the government and party leadership, only one woman—Yekaterina A. Furtseva, the Minister of Culture—currently holds a position of prominence at the national level.

1 MAY 1963

● Full Member, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party

■ Candidate Members, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party



## CHAPTER II. STAFFING MACHINERY

### A. PARTY AGENCIES

#### *Presidium*

Nowhere are the staffing functions of the Presidium spelled out but as the supreme policymaking body in the U.S.S.R., unfettered by constitutional restraints and unaccountable except in the most formal ritualistic sense to any other body of individuals in the country, the Presidium is the ultimate authority on selection, assignment, promotion, and training of personnel; career development programs and criteria; incentive systems—in fact, all phases of the staffing process. The Presidium is not only the final arbiter on these matters but an active participant in the day-to-day operations of the staffing mechanism as well. This is so because power in the Soviet Union, since it depends not at all on legal conferment and is only weakly buttressed by constitutional tradition, must be wielded daily to be maintained. Direct absolute control over the staffing of key positions is therefore an indispensable condition for the exercise of supreme political power.

In the staffing field the Presidium:

1. Establishes basic personnel policies for all elements of the state service (Party, government, and quasi-independent "mass" organizations);
2. Determines the personnel needs of the state in the aggregate and for key positions in particular;
3. Establishes basic criteria for staffing state service positions;
4. Develops programs for creating a reservoir of personnel with talent, training and experience in an assortment geared to the present and anticipated future needs of the state;
5. Monitors the operation of the staffing mechanism with particular attention to the performance of personnel assigned to key trouble spots, strategic operations and high priority programs;
6. Selects key administrative and political personnel in the upper echelon of the state service, including the replenishing of its own ranks.

In the performance of the above functions, the Presidium, of course, relies heavily on other elements of the state, both party and government, for information and recommendations. Presidium members, however, involve themselves in great detail in the whole range of staffing activities. There are, in fact, few of the governing functions in which they show such daily personal interest or to which they consistently devote a greater share of their time. It should be noted, however, that this concern stems in part from the fact that Presidium members not only determine policy but also supervise the execution of that policy in considerable detail. This gathering of the policymaking and the policy-implementing functions in the hands of a few men—and ultimately one man—is one of the hallmarks of the Soviet system and nowhere is the merger more clearly evident than in the staffing field.

## 10 STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The size of the Presidium is not fixed in statute nor established by custom; but since it is a real working group practical considerations have dictated that it remain fairly small and compact. Currently it consists of 12 members who exercise the full prerogatives and responsibilities of the office, and 6 candidate members of lesser prestige and authority who participate in varying degree.

The influence of individual Presidium members in the formulation of policy in the staffing field, as in other spheres of national life, varies with their training, experience, and current administrative duties, as well as with the political weight they carry. The concept of the Presidium as a committee of equals, espoused so strongly in the early years of the post-Stalin period, was so clearly invalidated by Khrushchev's victory in 1957 that Soviet propaganda has long since dropped any pretense to the fiction. In fact, Khrushchev is frequently referred to as the "head" of the Presidium, although formally no such position exists.

In dealing with broad questions of personnel policy, Khrushchev appears to rely most heavily on First Deputy Premiers Kosygin and Mikoyan, "President" Brezhnev, who despite the political insignificance of the "presidency" is a strong figure in policy councils, and Party Secretary Kozlov.

Although Mikoyan, Kosygin, and Brezhnev, with wide-ranging experience in supervising government operations, have great influence in staffing, the man whose voice is most often heard on staffing problems is probably Kozlov.<sup>1</sup> As second ranking secretary he acts as Khrushchev's "political" deputy, exercising general supervision over the professional party machine with particular attention to the allocation of the manpower and resources of the party. In this capacity he has had the opportunity to develop an intimate knowledge of the broad sweep of personnel problems and a keen awareness of the resources of the country for staffing the upper level executive, administrative, scientific, and engineering posts. In the last analysis, however, the decisions are Khrushchev's; no truly important assignments can be made without his personal knowledge and approval, and the top leaders of the party and government are probably chosen directly by him.

### *The Secretariat*

The selection, assignment, and training of personnel for virtually all positions of responsibility in Soviet life, be they in the party, the government, or in the quasi-independent specialized or professional organizations, is one of the major functions of the professional party machine or apparatus. This machine, which equates roughly to the full-time paid party officials, includes in addition to the Central Committee Secretariat and its executive staff, a highly disciplined hierarchy of subordinate secretariats and staffs corresponding to the republics, oblasts, and lesser administrative divisions of the country. Collectively and through the individual activities of its members, the Secretariat provides day-to-day executive direction for the entire party machine and in so doing, administers the whole range of the party's responsibilities in the staffing field.

The vast majority of proposals for new policies in the staffing field or modifications of existing ones either originate in the Secretariat or

<sup>1</sup> Kozlov has recently been reported ill, probably with a heart attack. What effect his illness might have on his status in the Soviet top leadership is not clear at this time.

elsewhere in the party machine, or at least funnel through the Secretariat at one point or another. The Secretariat prepares policy proposals for Presidium consideration, or, in the case of those formulated elsewhere, reviews and gives recommendations.

The Secretariat through its executive staff checks on the staffing of key positions, recommends release or reassignment of individuals whose performance fails to meet desired standards, and selects suitable candidates for vacancies. Approval of the Secretariat is a necessary condition for all appointments to upper echelon positions. A list of the positions requiring Secretariat approval would include all the important "national security" positions, the upper executive positions in the government apparatus, the leading party positions down to the oblast or provincial level, and a vast array of others which for one reason or another are deemed politically sensitive or are of critical importance in some other respect. In addition, the Secretariat develops criteria for the staffing of party positions at all levels and oversees their application.

In trying to satisfy the virtually insatiable demands of the Soviet state system for more and better qualified executives, administrators, managers, scientists, and engineers, the Secretariat's executive staff actively seeks out promising candidates, and supervises their careers to give them the range and depth of experience and training needed for the more and more complex and exacting upper echelon positions.

The central personnel records of the party are maintained by the executive staff of the Secretariat. These records include basic party information on all party members. Complete dossiers are maintained on all men assigned to key positions and also on those who show promise for eventual upper echelon responsibilities.

On occasion the responsibilities of the Secretariat in the staffing field are preempted by the Presidium. There is little chance of serious conflict, however. The nature of the interlocking directorate of the Soviet state system tends to keep the two bodies in concert. Moreover, Khrushchev, "Head" of the Presidium, and First Secretary, would probably resolve any disagreements that do arise.

The administrative duties of the Secretariat are divided among its members, currently 12, four of whom—Khrushchev, Kozlov, Kuusinen and Suslov—are also members of the Presidium. Each secretary has a specific set of responsibilities. Khrushchev, as First Secretary, is of course head of the Secretariat. As noted above, Kozlov is the second ranking secretary with responsibility for general supervision of the Secretariat and its central staff. The other duties are parceled out among the remaining secretaries (see chart 2). The number of secretaries with responsibilities in the field of relations with foreign Communist parties is unusually high, undoubtedly a reflection of the challenge to Soviet hegemony in the Communist world posed by the rift with China and Albania.

Prior to November 1962 each secretary had responsibility for the supervision of one or more of the departments in the executive staff, with considerable authority to make decisions in the fields of his department's responsibilities. Although Khrushchev, Kozlov, and the Secretariat as a whole gave some overall supervision to the work of individual secretaries and took note of complaints and criticisms, on the bulk of issues the secretary's decisions were for all intents and purposes final. There is reason to believe that in this situation the

CHART 2

**PARTY SECRETARIAT**

1 MAY 1963

SECRETARY	PROBABLE FIELDS (obviously incomplete)
Khrushchev, N. S.	1st Secretary; head of the Secretariat
Kozlov, F. R.	2nd-in-command; general supervision of the Secretariat and its central staff
Suslov, M. A.	CPSU relations with foreign Communist parties; coordination of the world Communist movement
Kuusinen, O. V.	CPSU relations with foreign Communist parties
Andropov, Yu. V.	CPSU relations with Sino-Soviet Bloc Communist parties
Ponomarev, B. N.	CPSU relations with non-bloc Communist parties
Demichev, P. N.	Chemical and Light Industry
Ilichev, L. F.	Ideological Questions
Polyakov, V. I.	Agriculture
Rudakov, A. P.	General Industry and Construction
Titov, V. N.	Organizational-Party Questions
Shelepin, A. N.	Party-State Control

CHART 3  
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THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE

1 MAY 1963





CHART 4


Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200020003-7  
BUREAU FOR THE RSFSR

1 MAY 1963




## CENTRAL ASIAN BUREAU

1 MAY 1963



## TRANSCAUCASIAN BUREAU

1 MAY 1963



● FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU

■ CANDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU

▲ MEMBER, CENTRAL AUDITING COMMISSION, CPSU



individual secretary tended to lose sight of the legitimate interests of other elements of the state machinery and missed valuable perspectives which a wider range of viewpoints might have afforded.

In November 1962, as part of a broad restructuring of the party machine, work in the Secretariat was reorganized and new units set up. This change was seemingly designed to provide an orderly and continuing mechanism for ensuring that a wide variety of professional viewpoints were brought to bear in making basic decisions in the various broad fields of secretarial responsibility and that decisions in one field were adequately coordinated with work in other fields (see chart 3).

Primary responsibility in the staffing field had been centered in the Party Organs Department,<sup>2</sup> which was also responsible for overseeing the internal operations of the Party, the Komsomol (Communist youth organization), and the trade unions. Supervision of its operations was the direct concern of Kozlov who performed that function along with general supervision of the Secretariat.

In the new scheme of things Kozlov is relieved of direct responsibility for supervision of the department but presumably he will continue to keep a close eye on its operations. Secretariat level supervision has been retained but instead of the full responsibility being vested in a single secretary, it is to be exercised at least partially by a Commission for Organizational-Party Questions set up in November 1962 under the chairmanship of Vitaly Titov, who was simultaneously made a member of the Secretariat. Titov was head of the Party Organs Department for the Union Republics at the time of his new assignment. It seems a slightly better than even bet that he will continue in that capacity as well as chair the commission.

The membership of the commission has not been made public so there is little basis yet for an estimate of the extent to which Titov will be able to control its deliberations. Presumably the commission is intended to bring a missing element of "collective" leadership and provide wider political experience in staffing matters. It is probably intended to perform the functions of a policy planning committee as well as to provide guidelines for the implementation of policy laid down by the Secretariat and the Presidium in the organizational and personnel field.

#### *The Central Staff of the Party*

Most of the departments of the executive staff of the central party organization are supervised by one of the commissions or bureaus set up in November 1962, or by the "Bureau for the RSFSR," established in 1956. A few departments appear to be directly subordinate to the Secretariat (see charts 3 and 4).

The RSFSR Bureau corresponds somewhat to the party presidiums in the other 14 republics, but differs in the method of its selection, i.e., it is confirmed by the all-Union Central Committee instead of by the Central Committee's republic counterparts.<sup>3</sup> The exact relationship between the Secretariat and the Bureau for the RSFSR is not completely clear, but the bureau seems to function rather like an independent subcommittee of the Secretariat for dealing with RSFSR

<sup>2</sup> There were two "party organs" departments in the executive staff, one for the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and one for the Union Republics. The Union Republic one was the more important since it had broad, nationwide responsibilities.

<sup>3</sup> Unlike the other republics, the RSFSR does not have its own Central Committee but is administered directly by the central party organization.

problems. A close working relation is maintained between an RSFSR department and its central counterpart.

The new Central Asian and Transcaucasian Bureaus appear to be super-republic coordinating agencies but not enough is yet known of their organization and functions to clarify their relation to the Secretariat or to the party organizations of the republics they encompass--Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Turkmenia and Tadzhikistan (Central Asian) and Armenia, Azerbaydzhan and Georgia (Transcaucasian).

The fields of responsibility of most of the staff departments are generally reflected in their names. The "administrative organs" departments, however, cover a potpourri--the courts, public prosecutor's office, organs of state control, and police and security forces, and health, social welfare, and physical culture agencies; "ideological" covers the fields of mass communications, education, science, propaganda, literature and art. The publishing houses Pravda and Kommunist function as separate departments but maintain close collaboration with the Ideological Department. Although each department is supposed to be consulted on personnel assignments in its functional field--the Defense Industry Department, for example, on the assignment of a director for a munitions plant--the primary responsibility and ultimate authority, as noted above, is lodged in the Party Organs Department.

A deputy head of the union-republic Party Organs Department in 1955 described the encompassing nature of the department's responsibilities in the staffing field in the following terms: He said that the department handled *all* questions relating to the assignment of personnel in party, government, and elsewhere--that even the appointment of functionaries in the other departments of the central staff had to be passed upon by the Party Organs Department. Control over the activities of central, interregional, and republic party schools which prepared personnel for responsible assignments in the party, government, and trade unions was a function of the department, as well as the selection of students for those schools. Also, the department maintained the personnel records of the party. Thus, personnel selection, training and assignment responsibilities were centered in this department; available evidence indicates that this is as true today as it was in 1955.

The staffing function is centered in two of the approximately nine sectors into which the department is divided (see chart 5). The Cadres (personnel) Sector is the operating sector; the Single Party Card Sector is essentially a support group, maintaining the personnel records. The territorial sectors also play a role in staffing for they maintain field agents who along with their other responsibilities check on the quality of personnel in key positions and presumably recruit for vacancies.

One other department enters the staffing picture when the assignment in question is to a post abroad. The Department for Travel Abroad rules on the political reliability and suitability for a foreign assignment of individuals proposed by any Soviet agency for posts in foreign countries.

#### *Subordinate Secretariats and Staffs*

The restructuring of the party machine, begun in November 1962 and not yet complete, is the most ambitious reform of the party structure since the early days of the Communist regime. Although

CHART 5

**PROBABLE ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF  
PARTY ORGANS FOR THE UNION REPUBLICS**

HEAD  
V. N. Titov

1st DEPUTY HEAD  
P. F. Pigalev

DEPUTY HEAD  
?

DEPUTY HEAD  
N. A. Belukha

FUNCTIONAL SECTORS

TERRITORIAL SECTORS

STATUTORY QUESTIONS  
V. A. Gorin

UKRAINE, MOLDAVIA,  
& BELORUSSIA  
?

SINGLE PARTY CARD  
G. F. Yudin

TRANSCAUCASUS  
V. P. Shimansky

CADRES  
?

KAZAKHSTAN &  
CENTRAL ASIA  
?

TRAINING & RETRAINING  
CADRES  
Z. I. Klyucheva

BALTIC REPUBLICS  
?

TRADE UNION &  
KOMSOMOL ORGANS  
G. I. Fedotov

there are a few local variations, the general plan involves dividing the Party into two locally separate segments, one concerned with industrial (urban) areas and activities and the other concerned with agricultural (rural) areas and activities. Each segment has its own secretariat and appropriate staff departments, including Party Organs Departments. The staffing of lower level positions in rural areas has thus been separated organizationally from the staffing of positions of comparable importance in urban areas. Since control over the staffing of upper echelon positions is exercised by the central staff in Moscow the urban-rural division of the party machine will have little immediate effect on the staffing of key national positions. On the lower levels, however, the new arrangement will probably make transfers from rural to urban (or urban to rural) posts more difficult than heretofore.

The primary contribution of the lower echelon departments to the staffing of key national positions lies in the function they perform in improving the manpower pool. This includes the initial selection of promising young men and women for responsible local posts, helping them develop experience and competence, and recommending capable individuals to the attention of the central authorities.

For carrying out the staffing function, the lower echelon Party Organs Departments are organized in much the same way as the Central Party Organs Department described above. Each has a Cadres Sector and a Party Card Sector. Their functions and activities in relation to the positions—Party, government, or other—which they control are essentially similar to those of the department in Moscow.

#### B. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Despite the crucial role of the party apparatus in supervising, controlling, and administering the regime's policies in the staffing field, the major share of work in staffing government operations is performed by the government bureaucracy itself. Special government agencies develop tables of organization, job classifications and salary scales for all government agencies, activities, and installations. They administer personnel policies, and collect, process, and maintain statistical data relevant to the staffing process.


The government machinery, as a whole, shares in highlighting problems in the staffing field, and develops information reports and policy proposals for consideration by the party Presidium. These functions channel through the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the executive head of the government, which, within the framework of policies established by the party Presidium, makes decisions governing the operation of the government, interprets state policy, assigns tasks for its implementation, and resolves conflicts arising in the course of government operations.

The government Presidium supervises the staffing of upper echelon positions—down through heads of the major subdivisions of a ministry or state committee—and monitors the operation of the staffing mechanism throughout the government bureaucracy. Its decisions are normally final, just as if made by the party Presidium. The latter probably would take up a problem only if major policy shifts were at issue or if the problem cut across into spheres of interest and responsibility of the top leaders not on the government Presidium.

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# SUPREME COUNCIL OF NATIONAL ECONOMY

1 MAY 1963



● FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU


■ CANDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU

Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200020003-7

CHART 6

## USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

1 MAY 1963



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Each government agency recruits for positions in its own organization, and trains, assigns, promotes, transfers, or dismisses its personnel. Personnel actions in regard to all positions of responsibility within the agency require the express prior approval in each individual case of the appropriate party unit. For upper echelon positions, including all key "national security" positions, the approval must come from the central Secretariat in Moscow. The top 15-20 percent of all government positions are in this manner directly "controlled" by the party machine; assignments to the remaining 80-85 percent of the positions are "uncontrolled," i.e., are completely within the purview of the employing agency, subject to compliance with existing classification schedules, tables of organization and service regulations.

The Council of Ministers is composed of a Chairman (Premier), First Deputy Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen, heads of various Ministries, state committees and other agencies, and certain other individuals included on the Council because of either their position or their responsibilities. The Council is charged by the Soviet Constitution with directing the work of ministries and other governmental bodies, executing the national economic plan and the state budget, strengthening the monetary system, conducting foreign affairs, and supervising the general structure of the armed forces. It is far too large—on May 1, 1963, there were 82 members—for effective decision making. The actual decisions are made by the much smaller Presidium of the Council of Ministers, with the full Council, which meets only rarely, giving pro forma approval.

The Presidium is the executive head of the Council of Ministers. Its position and role in the government structure are thus somewhat akin to that of the party Secretariat in the party hierarchy. The government Presidium consists of the Premier, the First Deputy Premier, and the Deputy Premiers plus other "individuals personally designated by the Council of Ministers." The Minister of Finance is almost certain to be among these others. As Premier, Khrushchev is head of the government Presidium. Mikoyan and Kosygin, the two senior First Deputies divide the major responsibilities between them and substitute for Khrushchev when he is absent. Mikoyan is concerned more with foreign affairs—including foreign economic relations—while Kosygin is primarily concerned with domestic matters. Ustinov, appointed First Deputy in March 1963, is supreme coordinator for economic activities. The Deputy Premiers are assigned special responsibility for certain key fields (Dymshits—industrial management; Lesechko—foreign economic relations; Lomako—economic planning; Novikov—capital construction; Rudnev—coordination of scientific research; Smirnov—defense production; Shelepin—government control and inspection; Polyansky—agriculture).

Just as the party Secretariat is represented in the ruling party Presidium by three secretaries (in addition to Khrushchev) so the government Presidium is represented by three officials in addition to Khrushchev—Mikoyan, Kosygin, and Polyansky. Thus the views of the government executives on staffing matters are assured a respectable hearing in the party Presidium.

None of the members of the government Presidium are personnel specialists, but throughout their careers all have had to devote a large share of their time to staffing problems and several of them have been

involved in the staffing process not only as officials responsible for the managerial functions of the government, but also, at one time or another, as party executives.

The government Presidium does have a staff to assist it in the personnel work incident to the operations of the Council of Ministers. Little is known about the scope of authority or range of responsibility of this staff but it probably exists primarily to coordinate the work of the personnel departments of the individual agencies, ensuring uniform interpretation and application of existing regulations, and to keep the Premier and Deputy Premiers informed on the state of personnel work in the government. In addition, it would handle the paper work on those personnel actions which are formalized by decree of the Council of Ministers.

Functions related to staffing procedures are spread among several government agencies. The state budget, prepared by the Ministry of Finance, establishes the wage fund of the various ministries, state committees, officers and enterprises. The Central Commission on Staffs, an agency of the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for ensuring that the table of organization and salary schedule of each agency or institution meet the requirements of sound administrative practice and accord with existing legislation. The commission conducts an annual review of all staffing schedules and, if they are satisfactory, registers them for the coming year. An organization cannot draw upon its salary account in the state bank until the staffing schedule it has submitted has been approved. Approval of the commission must also be obtained for any changes in the table of organization or salary schedule desired by an organization during the year. The Control-Auditing Administration of the Ministry of Finance checks on all departments, offices, and institutions for adherence to authorized personnel staffs, salary rates, and wage funds.

The State Committee on Labor and Wages is responsible for working out uniform salary scales and preparing job classifications for all government positions. It is also charged with preparing drafts for government legislation in the salary and wage field.

The Central Statistical Administration gathers, collects, and disseminates manpower statistics, and it maintains the government's central personnel file. The latter includes information on all leading personnel and specialists, gathered by means of special censuses. A major census taken on December 1, 1956, by this administration listed a little over nine million persons in the "leading personnel and specialists" category.

The Party-State Control Commission, a joint control agency of the party and government, is charged with detecting violations of established laws, government regulations, and party directives. In the staffing field it duplicates some of the work of the Control-Auditing Administration of the Ministry of Finance, but the Party-State Control Commission has much broader responsibilities and it can levy administrative penalties for violations.

The Department for Planning the Training and Placement of Graduates, a department of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, collects requests from government agencies for graduates of the higher educational institutions operated by the ministry. It matches the requests with the expected output of each educational institution and allocates the filling of the requests on the



basis of priority need among the various educational institutions by means of a placement order. The responsibility of the department then ceases. All further contact is between the educational institution and the agency requesting graduates.

Each government agency has a personnel department to handle the routine functions involved in the staffing process and to advise the minister, chairman, or other head of agency on personnel matters. These departments maintained the records on personnel whose appointments, promotions or transfers are the direct responsibility of the top officers of the agency. The personnel department also supervises the work of the personnel units in the various offices and enterprises under the jurisdiction of the agency and works out plans for allotting new graduates among the agency's components. The head of the personnel department is usually one of the top officers in the agency—oftentimes one of the deputies to the chief. Formal education in personnel administration has been conspicuously lacking; most personnel specialists have learned the work on the job. An effort has recently been made to improve the quality of personnel administration by assigning to personnel work graduates of juridical faculties who have concentrated on labor, civil and financial law.

### CHAPTER III. STAFFING FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURES

#### A. STAFFING FOR POLICYMAKING

In theory, the apex of the Soviet policymaking machine—the leadership of the Communist Party and hence of the nation—is staffed democratically through a system of indirect election. The formal process begins with the party rank and file, which elects delegates to rayon (district) party conferences; these delegates in turn meet to elect delegates to a conference (or congress) at the next higher echelon and so on to the national party congress held in Moscow approximately every four years. The party congress chooses a central committee to govern the party in the interval between congresses, and the central committee in turn elects the ruling Presidium and Secretariat.

In reality, however, Soviet party elections are totally devoid of choice and the election process has no relevance to the staffing of the top Soviet leadership. Since the defeat of the antiparty group (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, et al.) in June 1957, Khrushchev has determined who will be brought into the Presidium and Secretariat and has made the final decisions as to how these bodies will operate.

This fact, plus the absence of any regulations governing the size, terms of office, or division of effort within the ruling group, makes for considerable flexibility of operation; Khrushchev can adapt the top leadership as circumstances dictate.

Perhaps the most troublesome problem in the process is deciding who is to be brought into one of the ruling bodies once the need for additional personnel has been determined. However broad it may be, the previous experience of any prospective newcomer is certain to fall short of matching the complexity, magnitude or multiplicity of the problems with which he will have to cope as a policymaker. He must be able to participate in the formulation of policies affecting the entire scope of Soviet national and international life; and, if he is a Presidium member, also able to hold at least one collateral—and usually full-time—post in the party or government bureaucracy.

To a large extent, then, the severe demands of high office in the Soviet Union themselves limit the number of candidates available. No serious consideration is given to the official who rates less than outstanding. He need not have a higher education—or much formal schooling at all, for that matter—if he has all or most of the other qualifications on which Khrushchev puts a premium. In addition to such obvious prerequisites as considerable experience and demonstrated managerial-administrative ability, these include initiative, drive, imagination, resourcefulness, and perhaps even a judicious amount of audacity.

The precise degree to which Khrushchev's closest colleagues are involved in the selection process cannot be determined, but it seems

certain that they participate at least in an "advise and consent" capacity. Khrushchev very likely solicits their opinions as to who best fills the needs of the moment and he may rely somewhat upon their personal knowledge of and experiences with the men being considered for the job. But Khrushchev is jealous of his power and prerogatives. Mindful of the abortive machinations of the anti-party group, he is sure to veto any candidate whom he regards as remotely capable of similar political opposition. Thus, in addition to possessing those qualities enumerated above, any newcomer to the top leadership can generally be presumed to be a "Khrushchev man" in the sense that he is in fundamental agreement with Khrushchev's policies and methods and is unlikely to side against his mentor in the event of a new showdown.

This, of course, does not mean that Khrushchev has surrounded himself with a group of "yes men." In marked contrast to Stalin, he prefers to rule more by persuasion than by diktat. While there is little doubt that he has the final say whenever he wants it, he listens to his colleagues, is influenced by their opinions, and on occasion has deferred to their judgment. In short, he expects sound advice from those around him and his expectations are reflected in the staffing of the three bodies primarily responsible for making and executing key Kremlin global policies—the party Presidium and Secretariat, and on the government side, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.

#### *The Party Presidium*

Although the subject is clearly of more than academic interest, a discussion of Khrushchev's own rise to predominance in the Presidium is beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to recall that he was a member of the handpicked Politburo before Stalin died and that his leadership therefore was not thrust upon his colleagues from without; it was carefully and thoroughly developed from within the ruling clique. Thus, post-Stalin changes in the composition of the Presidium—particularly until June 1957—may well reflect Khrushchev's political maneuvering and the countermoves of his opponents as much as they represent the attempts of a new and untried "collective leadership" to adapt to the complex tasks of running the country.

It is one of the peculiarities of the Soviet system that these two factors cannot be divorced. Although additions to or deletions from the leadership are ostensibly made only in order to effect a redistribution of labor among its members, political considerations are ever present, and any change in the membership of the Presidium (or the Secretariat) inevitably alters the balance of power in the hierarchy. After his victory over the anti-party group left him as the unchallenged leader of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev was faced with a twofold problem in assembling his policymaking machine. He had first to draw the best available talent into the Presidium and to dispose it so as best to realize the goals which he envisioned. Secondly and of equal importance at least at that juncture, he had to staff the leadership with men about whose personal allegiance he had few doubts.

In order to satisfy these needs, Khrushchev has brought three groups of men together to constitute the full (voting) membership of the Presidium. He has retained (or brought back) men who, like himself, were originally selected as members by Stalin (Mikoyan, Suslov,

Kuusinen, Kosygin, Shverniki); he has added men who were already high-ranking leaders under Stalin (Brezhnev); and he has brought up men of his own choosing from the lower echelons of the party (Kozlov, Kirilenko, Podgorny, Polyansky, and Voronov). The political factor in staffing the Presidium is readily apparent in the last group; of the five, Kirilenko, Polyansky, and Podgorny came up through the Ukrainian apparatus, which Khrushchev bossed from 1938 until 1949. Brezhnev, too, is one of the old retainers from the Ukraine. Indeed, those who served there under Khrushchev appear to form something of a clique, and throughout the years, Khrushchev has understandably tended to favor them in making appointments to high office.

It has never become clear whether Khrushchev first selects a new Presidium member and then assigns him to an appropriate collateral duty, or conversely picks a man for the collateral post and then, because of the importance of the post at the time, adds the appointee to the Presidium. Some collateral positions—notably the party first and second secretaryships, the premiership and the “presidency”—are always held by Presidium members; the two appointments seem to go hand-in-hand. But Presidium members are often shifted around in collateral assignments without automatically losing Presidium status. Brezhnev, who was a member of the Secretariat when elevated into the policymaking group in 1957, was transferred to the “presidency” in 1960. Kozlov provides an even better example. He has also been a full member of the Presidium since 1957. At that time he was party boss in Leningrad, but was shortly named premier of the RSFSR; he became U.S.S.R. first deputy premier in 1958, and is now party second secretary and Khrushchev’s heir apparent. In all likelihood, there are no hard and fast rules determining whether Presidium membership or collateral assignment takes precedence, and each case is probably decided on its merits.

There is, however, some basis for speculation that assignment to certain collateral posts is now automatically accompanied by candidate (nonvoting) membership in the Presidium. Presumably in order to introduce a measure of stability into the leadership, Khrushchev has, since 1957, conferred candidate status on representatives from several of the Soviet Union’s national minority areas. In the current Presidium these areas are represented as follows: Central Asia by Uzbek party chief Rashidov; the Transcaucasus by Georgian party boss Mzhavanadze; Byelorussia by republic party chief Mazurov. Since its party overlord Podgorny is a full Presidium member, the Ukraine is represented among the candidates by the republic premier, Shecherbitsky. In addition to these men, the chairman of the U.S.S.R.’s Central Council of Trade Unions is traditionally a Presidium candidate.

At least in terms of size and of the men who have served on it, the Presidium as a whole has tended to relative stability since 1957. Eleven of the 18 present members have served since that time. Nevertheless, the attrition, additions, and changes in collateral assignments which have taken place have profoundly altered many of the political relationships which once characterized Khrushchev’s system of rule.

Following the downfall of the antiparty group, the Presidium was heavily weighted with party officials—men whose collateral assignments lay primarily in the field of party administration. At the time, 17 members were party officials while only seven were engaged in

supervising the government machinery. This experiment in policymaking with party parochial interests so heavily represented lasted less than three years. The first steps to reduce the preponderance of party professionals in the policy councils of state were taken in May 1960, and at the 22d Party Congress in October 1961 a new pattern emerged. It is characterized primarily by a better balance between party and government institutional interests in the policymaking function, and includes a reduction in the size of the Presidium. This shift has been accomplished largely at the expense of the Secretariat; whereas all eight secretaries were Presidium members in June 1957, only four of the current 12 are formulators as well as executors of state policy.

In shifting to this new tack in staffing the Presidium, Khrushchev has not, of course, had any intention of curtailing the power and authority of the party machine. Rather, he seems to have concluded that although the policymaker should ideally be a broadly based generalist whose advice and opinions transcend departmental interests, few men can in fact resist the tendency to parochialism engendered by daily responsibility for a segment of the governing and administrative machinery. He evidently believes that some balancing of departmental interests is necessary in order to avoid a lopsided approach to critical policy problems. Khrushchev's continued predilection for the "party" point of view and a legacy of fears and prejudices left by his struggle to achieve and maintain power have, however, kept him from applying the "balance of interests" principle with logical consistency. For example, none of the three principal "national security" agencies—defense, foreign affairs and the intelligence services—is represented, and among the full members, party functionaries outnumber government administrators by six to five (Khrushchev not counted) whenever Podgorny—who is normally resident in Kiev—is called up to Moscow for an important session.

The "balance of interests" principle seems most usually to apply when the full Presidium is called upon to consider the adoption of certain policy initiatives. In these cases, Khrushchev clearly wants to ensure that all the ramifications of his policies are thoroughly examined from differing points of view, and he particularly wants to hear the opinions of those whose collateral duties involve the implementation of the decision at hand. Thus, when such matters as the allocation of national resources, major party or governmental reorganizations, or fundamental shifts in the Kremlin line are under consideration, Khrushchev will very likely summon all full and candidate members of the Presidium to Moscow to thrash out both the details and the implementation of the new policy. Since, however, the collateral assignments of the Presidium candidates lie primarily in the field of domestic affairs, they would not necessarily attend meetings devoted, for example, to Soviet foreign relations, trade and aid, or the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Presidium as a whole, then, cannot be considered as a formally constituted "national security council" which meets regularly to deal with all matters affecting the vital interests of the nation.

On the contrary, it is possible to distinguish within the Presidium several "teams," each headed by Khrushchev, which are probably the primary policy formulators in various spheres (see chart 9). Although he expects his colleagues to function as generalists, Khrushchev has

CHART 8




CHART 9

PROBABLE PARTY PRESIDIU POLICY-MAKING  
"TEAMS" AND PRINCIPAL ADVISORS

1 May 1963

Global Policy Issues		Party Issues		Domestic Economic Issues	
Military & Intelligence	Diplomacy & Trade	International Communism	Domestic Party Affairs	Industry	Agriculture
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Khrushchev</li> <li>● Kozlov</li> <li>● Mikoyan</li> <li>● Kosygin</li> <li>● Brezhnev</li> <li>● Gromyko</li> <li>● Malinovsky</li> <li>● Semichastny</li> <li>● Ustinov</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Khrushchev</li> <li>● Mikoyan</li> <li>● Brezhnev</li> <li>● Kosygin</li> <li>● Gromyko</li> <li>● Patolichev</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Khrushchev</li> <li>● Suslov</li> <li>● Kuusinen</li> <li>● Mikoyan</li> <li>● Kozlov</li> <li>● Andropov</li> <li>● Ponomarev</li> <li>● Illichev</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Khrushchev</li> <li>● Kozlov</li> <li>● Suslov</li> <li>● Brezhnev</li> <li>● Shvernik</li> <li>● Kirilenko</li> <li>● Podgorny</li> <li>■ Yefremov</li> <li>■ Titov</li> <li>■ Illichev</li> <li>■ Shelepin</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Khrushchev</li> <li>● Kosygin</li> <li>● Kirilenko</li> <li>● Polyansky</li> <li>● Mikoyan</li> <li>■ Grishin</li> <li>■ Demichev</li> <li>■ Rudakov</li> <li>■ Shelepin</li> <li>■ Ustinov</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Khrushchev</li> <li>● Voronov</li> <li>● Polyansky</li> <li>● Podgorny</li> <li>■ Yefremov</li> <li>■ Polyakov</li> <li>■ Demichev</li> <li>■ Shelepin</li> </ul>



Mbr, Presidium, Central Committee, CPSU



Candidate Mbr, Presidium, Central Committee, CPSU

Key to Advisors

Andropov	Secretary, CC, CPSU; Head, Department for Liaison with Communist and Worker's Parties of Socialist Countries.
Demichev	Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Bureau, CC, CPSU, for Light and Chemical Industry.
Gromyko	Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Illichev	Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Ideological Commission.
Malinovsky	Minister of Defense.
Patolichev	Minister of Foreign Trade.
Polyakov	Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Bureau for Agriculture.
Ponomarev	Secretary, CC, CPSU; Head, International Department (relations with Communist Parties of non-bloc countries).
Semichastny	Chairman, Committee of State Security (KGB).
Shelepin	Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Committee of Party-State Control.
Titov	Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Bureau for Organizational-Party Questions.
Ustinov	1st Deputy Premier; Chairman Supreme Economic Council.

nevertheless staffed the Presidium in such a way that men with long experience in relatively narrow fields are at his immediate beck and call, and he draws heavily on their specialized knowledge in developing the policies he introduces. Agricultural matters, for instance, appear to be assigned to Polyansky, Voronov, and Yefremov, and Podgorny is sometimes included, whereas policies affecting the international Communist movement are probably worked out by Suslov and Kuusinen. Whether or not the policies evolved by these teams are brought before the full Presidium is solely up to Khrushchev. There are no rules binding him to do so, and he does not need the approval of the "collective" leadership in order to put his policies and decisions into effect. Any attempt to lay down immutable laws for determining which issues will or will not be discussed at a meeting of all the leaders is, therefore, risky indeed and is probably foredoomed. Only one generalization seems safe to hazard: domestic political or economic matters—and especially the former—are much more likely to come before the full Presidium than are problems of Soviet foreign policy.

This became particularly apparent during the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962. The extreme gravity of the situation between October 22 and 29 would seemingly have necessitated a virtually continuous emergency session of the entire Presidium. But nothing of the sort took place. The Presidium candidates were not summoned to Moscow, and Podgorny—the only full member not resident in the capital—apparently remained in Kiev. There are, in fact, several indications that Khrushchev failed even to call in all of the Presidium members who do live in Moscow. Instead, when faced with a clear and present danger for the first time in his administration, he fell back on those leaders who, with a single exception, had served with him in high office during Stalin's last years.

Khrushchev made the decision to withdraw Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba in consultation apparently with Mikoyan (until his departure on the mission to Havana), Kosygin, Suslov, Brezhnev, and the heir apparent, Kozlov. These men appear to form a kind of "presidium within a presidium," an inner cabinet which at least in this case functioned as a Soviet "national security council." It is tempting to view their participation as resulting from their collateral assignments and thereby to suggest that the group enjoys a quasi-legal existence. It is, after all, composed of the party first secretary (Khrushchev) and his two principal deputies, the premier (again Khrushchev) and his two first deputies, and the "President" of the U.S.S.R. Such an approach might, however, serve to obscure the obvious. The plain fact seems to be that when the chips are down, Khrushchev relies on those Presidium members with the greatest experience for the problem at hand.

#### *The Secretariat*

The Central Committee Secretariat has often and aptly been described as "the party's powerful executive arm." It is the apex of the professional party machine, the principal executor of the party's policies, and, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, it supervises and directs the entire Soviet staffing process. The Secretariat is, then, concerned less with high policy per se than it is with daily political life. Yet it is precisely from the latter concern that its vital importance derives, for the Secretariat is the organ through which



the top leader dispenses political favor, maneuvers his candidates into the key posts in party and government, and builds the powerhouse of political support which, in essence, enables him to run the country.

The mechanism for staffing the Secretariat is the same as that for the Presidium—formal “election” by the Central Committee once Khrushchev has made his choice for the job. The man or men chosen must have the same general qualifications for service at the top as do the Presidium members. In making his selections for the Secretariat, however, Khrushchev will in almost all cases give priority consideration to those candidates who have had long service in the professional party machine in preference to men—however outstanding—who have come up through the government bureaucracy. Furthermore, because of the vast political powers inherent in a central party secretaryship, he is likely to rely considerably more upon his own judgment than on the advice of his colleagues, and if anything, to place an even higher premium on personal loyalty to himself. Here again, his proclivity to draw on the Ukrainian party apparatus emerges clearly. Two of the four new secretaries elected in November 1962 worked with him there after World War II.

There are no regulations governing the size of the Secretariat, and it has fluctuated more widely than has the Presidium. From February to July 1955 three secretaries—Khrushchev and two others—bore full administrative responsibility for the operation of the central party machine. The number of secretaries was gradually increased to ten and then dropped to five after the shift away from preponderant representation of party officialdom on the Presidium had begun to take shape. The number was raised to nine following the 22d Party Congress in October 1961, and at the central committee plenum a year later was increased to the present twelve. Political factors certainly played a major role in these fluctuations. But unlike those in the Presidium, where up to 1957 the active opposition of the anti-party group was involved, they seem more to reflect Khrushchev's experimentation in adjusting the Secretariat so as best to fulfill its missions, and his elimination of those who aroused his displeasure, either through serious on-the-job blunders or inability to stand up under the severe demands of the position.

Although the Secretariat is not formally a policymaking body, its work is intimately and inseparably connected with that of the Presidium. Four men—Khrushchev, Kozlov, Suslov, and Kuusinen—are currently members of both bodies, and there is little doubt that other secretaries often participate in the Presidium's work on an *ad hoc* basis.

There is, however, one aspect of the Secretariat's regular work which has a direct bearing on Soviet global operations: it conducts the Soviet party's relations with the other parties in the international Communist movement. This function is divided between the central committee department for relations with nonbloc parties and the department for relations with bloc parties, headed respectively by Boris Ponomarev and Yuri Andropov. Both men are members of the Secretariat. In addition, Kuusinen and Suslov—and of course Khrushchev—appear to have secretarial responsibilities concerned with world communism. Since all three of the latter are also Presidium members, it would seem likely that they constitute the

Presidium "team" which formulates policy in this field and that they directly supervise its implementation by Ponomarev and Andropov. In any event, it is these five men who are primarily involved in passing Moscow's orders, instructions, and advice to Communist parties throughout the world, coordinating the movement's activities and developments and formulating the Russian side of the argument in the continuing Sino-Soviet polemic.

The evident duplication of effort between Suslov and Kuusinen on the one hand and Ponomarev and Andropov on the other suggests that the Secretariat as a whole may be informally divided into two teams in a kind of "first and second string" arrangement. Khrushchev seems obviously to have an understudy in Kozlov, his heir apparent. If Ponomarev and Andropov are similarly understudying Suslov and Kuusinen, it may well be that Khrushchev has deliberately brought some of the relatively junior members of the Secretariat into that body to groom them for eventual succession. In the absence of any method for ensuring the orderly transfer of political power, Khrushchev might regard such a system as one means of seeing to it that the mainstream of his policies continues after he himself is gone. At least, a replacement system of this sort—if indeed there be one—ensures that the lower ranking secretaries have a good deal of experience before they are promoted into the realm of policy formulation or are assigned a larger portion of secretarial responsibility.

#### *The Government Presidium*

Unlike Soviet party bodies, the government of the U.S.S.R. is formally constituted once every four years. It is appointed by the legislature—the Supreme Soviet—at the first session after national elections and is theoretically responsible to the Supreme Soviet for all its policies and actions until the next election four years later. At that time, and in keeping with the facade of democracy which the Kremlin so carefully maintains, the premier and his government present their "resignations" to the incoming legislature, and a new government is formed. Any interim changes of government ministers or cabinet portfolios are effected by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (which acts for the legislature when it is not in session) and must be ratified at the next regular sitting of the Supreme Soviet. Approval of such changes is, of course, *pro forma* and unanimous; in actuality, the Soviet legislature has no control over the staffing or the actions of the executive branch.

Responsibility for carrying out the work of the government is centered in the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, which is made up of the premier (chairman of the Council of Ministers), his deputies, and certain other members of the "cabinet." The government Presidium is thus the primary executor of the national policies which are enunciated by the party Presidium. It has, however, a vital role in the process of policy formulation and it passes up to the party Presidium its recommendations, opinions and advice on such top priority matters as national defense, foreign policy, and allocation of national resources. At least in the initial stages, new policies in these fields are almost certainly originated and worked out on the government side.

As is the case with the top party bodies, there are no statutory limitations on the size of the government Presidium, although Khrush-

shchev has tended to keep it relatively small. From the summer of 1960 until the end of 1962, for example, there were two first deputy and four deputy premiers. Following the November central committee plenum, however, the top levels of the government were reorganized and the number of deputy premiers working under Khrushchev was raised to nine. In March 1963, deputy premier Dmitry Ustinov was promoted to a first deputy premiership. Unlike Mikoyan and Kosygin, however, he was not made a member of the party Presidium and there is as yet no indication that he will join in their function of deputizing for Khrushchev as government chief when the latter is away from Moscow.

In all likelihood, the party Presidium staffs the Presidium of the Council of Ministers directly; Khrushchev, Kosygin, and Mikoyan certainly work closely together in choosing the men they want as their subordinates in the government. Ultimately, Khrushchev himself decides who will get a deputy premiership, but in making his choice he probably relies on the advice and recommendations of his colleagues to a much greater extent than he does in staffing the top levels of the party hierarchy. This would seem to be true first because the government Presidium is more an administrative than a political body and thus personal allegiance to Khrushchev is not as much a priority qualification as it is for candidates to high party positions. Secondly, the burden of Khrushchev's own experience has been in the professional party apparatus; his surprisingly detailed knowledge of the personnel assets available there does not extend to the government bureaucracy.

In seeking candidates for service in the government Presidium, Khrushchev and his colleagues will give first consideration to men whose records clearly indicate the ability to oversee a specific field of the national government's activities without falling prey to the narrow parochialism so often characteristic of Soviet bureaucracy. The man chosen for a deputy premiership is, therefore, certain to be outstanding in his field, and he will very likely be a career civil servant whose managerial-administrative experience includes previous service as a government minister or deputy minister. In contrast to some of his superiors in the party Presidium and Secretariat, he will also probably have a higher—most likely technical—education. Certainly he will be a member of the Communist Party who is relatively active in party affairs, and he may be a member of the central committee. His experience need not, however, include service as a professional party worker. In fact, of the nine deputy premiers now serving in that body, only Polyansky and Shelepin have substantial backgrounds in party work, and both men have also held top level government assignments. Polyansky was chairman of the Council of Ministers in the RSFSR and Shelepin spent four years as head of the State Security Committee.

Just as in the party Presidium, there are very probably substantive teams or "task forces" in the government Presidium. They may not be formally constituted entities, and depending upon the job assigned them, will be headed by a deputy premier, by one of the first deputies, or by Khrushchev himself. In the case of a problem in foreign or military affairs, for example, Khrushchev might call together a committee composed of himself, first deputy premiers Kosygin, Mikoyan, and Ustinov (a specialist in problems affecting defense industries), and

## STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET UNION 29

the heads of the three "national security" agencies—defense, foreign affairs and the intelligence services. Such a task force might also include members of the collegiums of these three agencies. The members of the team report on the given situation, offer suggestions and advice, and discuss various alternative solutions to the problem at hand. To that extent, they participate in the formulation of Soviet national policy. Their primary function, however, is not to recommend policy decisions but to examine how best they can execute the policy once it has been decided upon by the party Presidium.

## B. STAFFING OPERATIONS IN THE GLOBAL POLICY FIELD

*Departments and Agencies*

The head of a ministry or state committee enjoys fairly broad discretionary powers in hiring, assigning, promoting, and transferring the rank and file personnel of his department or agency. However, his power to pick his immediate subordinates—the positions of his greatest vital concern—is far more restricted. While recognizing that meaningful executive responsibility requires correspondingly meaningful authority, including that of selecting the subordinates upon whom the effective operation of an organization depends, the top Soviet leaders are reluctant to let direct control of important positions slip from their fingers. They are, moreover, concerned that the solution of large problems of national interest, including the allocation of scarce executive talent, be decided at a level relatively free from departmental rivalries. The result is clearly a compromise. The views of the departmental head are given considerable weight in the selection of his deputies, the heads of the more important divisions of his organization, and other key personnel but the final decision is made in either the party or the government Presidium.

All such appointments require prior approval of the party Secretariat, but since the final decision on the appointment is made by the party Presidium or the government Presidium, with Khrushchev participating in either case, the action of the Secretariat is largely pro forma. The Secretariat (more properly, the appropriate elements in its executive staff) supplies personnel records and other pertinent reports when an appointment is under consideration but is not likely to take a stand on the issue. Once a decision has been reached, the appointment is formalized by decree of the Council of Ministers.

There is a second, somewhat larger, group of positions in the ministry or state committee, which, although still requiring prior party approval, are not normally the subject of personal attention by the top leaders. These include the lesser division chiefs, their deputies, and most of the positions in which technical control functions are vested, e.g., comptroller and inspector.

The agency has a relatively free hand in staffing the remaining positions. Assignments, transfers, promotions, and removals at the lower levels do not require prior party approval. (Assignments to overseas posts are an exception. See below under staffing Soviet missions abroad.)

Soviet "national security" agencies are strongly career-service oriented. Most upper level positions are staffed by personnel promoted from within the agency. Routinely when a position is vacant or soon to become vacant the top executive of the organization, pre-

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sumably after consultation with his staff, picks a candidate from within the organization and forwards his name for the party approval. Occasionally, however, the executive or the party unit "controlling" appointments to a particular position finds a better candidate outside the organization.

Agreement is supposed to be reached between the agency and the party unit before any personnel action affecting "controlled" positions is made. What happens when they are unable to reach agreement on a suitable candidate is not entirely clear. There is little doubt but that a supervisor has a strong voice in selecting his personnel. There is equally little doubt that the party unit can, and on occasion does insist on its candidate, even when he is strongly opposed by the supervisor. This latter happens most often when the subordinate is assigned for the purpose of checking on the supervisor. When a deadlock is reached the party Presidium settles the issue.

Very little is known about the inner workings of the party's staffing units. As noted earlier they maintain personnel files on all party members in their jurisdiction—the central files in Moscow containing data on every Communist in the country—as well as full dossiers on personnel (party members or not) in "controlled" positions. From these records they may find likely candidates. Moreover, party units in all parts of the country can be checked for individuals with the desired qualifications. If the priority need of the "national security" agency is high, the party unit can arrange to transfer a qualified individual from an agency with less critical need.


Scrutiny of the candidate's qualifications by the party agency is apt to be more thorough when the Presidium is not directly involved in making the appointment. One fairly common requirement is that the candidate be personally interviewed by officials at party headquarters in Moscow. Although one of the purposes of the requirement for party approval of upper echelon appointments is to provide a mechanism for securing the most effective deployment of the party's personnel resources, there is some evidence that the party review is often limited in ensuring that the minimum requirements for the position under consideration, as set forth in legislation or in party decrees, are met. One of the frequent complaints about the staffing procedure voiced in the party press is that party officials too often base their decisions about personnel on formal records and do not evaluate the individual's performance in actual working conditions.

The requirement for party approval of upper echelon personnel actions appears, nevertheless, to be the major limitation on the agency head's exercise of executive authority in the staffing field. Government service regulations, to be sure, prescribe staffing procedures and set some limits to the arbitrary authority of the top executive in each agency, and he, like all other government executives, must operate within budgetary ceilings, tables of organization, and salary schedules over which he has no direct control. These limiting factors, however, do not appear an undue restriction on his executive authority. The government service regulations set minimum qualifications (higher education, for example), for particular jobs and provide an orderly system for advancement within the organization, but they grant only minimal protection to the employee against the exercise of managerial power. In the Soviet system individual rights are strictly subordinated to the operating needs of the state

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# MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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machinery. The Soviet executive, therefore, in attempting to improve the quality of his organization's performance does not have to wrestle with such knotty problems as veteran's preference or "bumping" rights. There are few administrative obstacles to removing incompetent or mediocre performers from "uncontrolled" positions, which even in the "national security" agencies may run as high as 80 percent of the total. It is the dearth of competent individuals and an endemic unwillingness to delegate sizable chunks of authority to lower echelons that has led most top executives to accept, if not prefer, the dispersal of functions among a number of mediocre employees rather than concentrating them in the hands of a few, more competent, officers closer to the top of the organization.

#### *Soviet Missions Abroad*

Soviet foreign missions are formidable establishments with large numbers of regular diplomatic personnel and a spate of assigned representatives of other Soviet agencies embroiled in international affairs. The size of the staffs reflect not only the Soviet penchant for bureaucratic double-checking but also the wide range of fronts on which Soviet national interests are pursued abroad. The typical mission includes representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, and, in addition, one or more Party officials to maintain checks on the political orthodoxy of staff personnel.

All of these people are nominally subordinate to the ambassador, but in most cases he has little or no authority over any except the personnel of his own ministry and even among them he may not always be the real executive head. Each special group in the foreign mission maintains direct contact with its home organization; it receives its instructions direct from Moscow and reports back through its own departmental channels without the necessity of checking with the ambassador or coordinating with other elements of the embassy. The various programs carried out by the different groups are planned and coordinated in Moscow rather than in the field; there is no concept of the foreign mission as a "country team." Not only are the foreign mission personnel thus excluded from the day-to-day planning and coordinating function, but the areas in which they can exercise discretion are sharply circumscribed. They apparently have no authority to deal with new points that arise, however trivial, without instructions from Moscow.

In general, each ministry and state committee staffs its own overseas posts. Ambassadors and other chiefs of mission are probably among appointments passed on by the top Soviet leaders, with the other senior officers abroad coming within the purview of the appropriate staff unit in the party Secretariat. Since ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary are legal representatives of the state, their appointments are formalized by legislative decree. In addition, every individual of whatever rank who is proposed for an overseas assignment must be cleared by the Department for Travel Abroad in the party Secretariat. This is primarily a security clearance involving judgments on the suitability of an individual for foreign assignment as well as on his political reliability.

The effect of this system on the quality of overseas personnel is difficult to assess. On the one hand the strict limitations placed on

the exercise of authority and initiative tend to obscure many of the qualities normally associated with effective performance of overseas missions. By the same token the system places fewer demands on the staffing mechanism for highly competent people. Not only is there thus a tendency to accept run-of-the-mill performers, but the restricted scope of the Soviet diplomat's authority and responsibility abroad would seem to inhibit his development eventually into the top quality leader needed for posts of real authority in the ministry. The Soviet diplomatic environment, however, has produced several topnotch foreign affairs officials who have risen to places on the ministry's directing team, so compensating factors may be found in other phases of diplomatic work.

#### *Career Development*

As a general rule each "national security" agency seeks to develop its own executive personnel. The talents, skills, and experiences required tend to be specialized and are not normally developed in other areas of Soviet national life. Similarly, there is little demand elsewhere for personnel developed in military, diplomatic, or intelligence operations so promotion opportunities tend to be limited to the employee's own agency. The Ministry of Defense is most "closed" in this regard, with the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, both of which make considerable use of engineers, technicians, and managers developed in other government operations—particularly in the industrial sector—allowing for somewhat greater interagency mobility. The Committee of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lie somewhere in between. In the diplomatic field, for example, it has been the practice for a number of years to staff a little under a third of the ambassadorial posts with individuals drawn from executive positions in other government departments or from high party posts. The ambassadorial posts in the Sino-Soviet bloc countries are clearly reserved for such persons, and there appears to be some tendency to use them in staffing the posts in countries on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. Some of these "outsiders" are retained in foreign affairs work after their ambassadorial assignments are terminated.

The selection process for career service in the "national security" agencies starts early. The educational system provides the initial screening. Higher education, which is rapidly becoming a requirement for advancement to upper echelon positions throughout the entire state service, has been firmly established as a requisite for professional advancement in the "national security" field. Except for physicians and a few other specialists who can be granted direct commissions, entry into commissioned military service can be gained only by graduation from the various officer candidate schools which give college level academic education in addition to military instruction. Entry into other career services—trade and aid, intelligence and security, and foreign affairs—is not so rigidly and uniformly controlled. Many new recruits come from the several higher educational institutions operated by the agencies concerned, such as the Higher Diplomatic School (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or the Institute of Foreign Trade (Ministry of Foreign Trade). In addition, graduates of other institutions of higher learning are also accepted.

There is an elaborate system for the initial placement of graduates of Soviet higher educational institutions. The current procedures




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
# MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

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
## COLLEGIUM




## JOINT POLICY & CONTROL UNITS



## ADMINISTRATIVE & TECHNICAL AGENCIES



## FORCE COMPONENTS



## TYPES OF OPERATIONAL FORCES



● FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU

■ CANDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU

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are spelled out in a directive issued in June 1960 by the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education. The procedures are intended to assure that trained specialists are employed as quickly as possible after graduation and that priority is given to vacancies in critical sectors of the national economy. In general, the student who has been accepted by one of the special military or foreign service schools has already been earmarked for entry into the career service of one of the "national security" agencies. If not, he will be assigned by a procedure similar to that used in placing graduates of the general education institutions of higher learning.

Several months before the end of the school year, a placement commission is set up at each of the higher educational institutions. This commission, which has the ultimate responsibility for placing the graduates, consists of school and local government officials, representatives of the trade unions and the Party, and often representatives from offices, agencies, or institutions seeking to "recruit" new graduates.

The placement plan for the individual school, consisting of a roster of jobs to which graduates from this particular school are to be assigned, is provided the placement commission by the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education's Department for Planning the Training and Placement of Graduates, through which funnel all requests from government agencies for new graduates. The commission then attempts to match the available candidates with the jobs to be filled. The commission is instructed to consider the personal preferences of the graduates insofar as possible and to make allowance for factors such as family responsibilities. The commission's decision, however, is final, and each graduate is legally obligated to serve for three years at the job to which he is assigned.

In the diplomatic service, the KGB (Committee of State Security), and the military establishment, degree of authority, assignments, and promotions are regulated through a system of personal ranks or titles. (The trade and aid organizations may not employ the personal rank system, but full details on their promotion and grading systems are lacking.) The KGB uses a system of ranks comparable to that of the military, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses graded diplomatic ranks and titles. After entering the career service of the ministry or committee the new officer is rotated through a variety of assignments intended to provide broad experience, advanced training, and scope for the development of his capabilities. The military program of career development includes tours of troop duty alternating with schooling and staff assignments. Recently political officer positions have been added to the list of assignments in the normal rotation sequence. Officers in the foreign relations field alternate desk tours with foreign assignments, and also include periods of course work in higher educational institutions.

Promotions in all the career services are normally based on a composite of criteria. Minimum time-in-grade, performance ratings, achievement in service schools or training courses, existence of a vacancy, and the candidate's "political" record are factors governing promotion. Although seniority as such is not a basis for promotion, there is some evidence that length of time-in-grade figures heavily, at least in the lower grades or ranks. The requirements are strict and the examinations uniform and highly competitive.

Political qualifications are important criteria for promotion to any position of responsibility in the Soviet Union. In fact, party literature

on the subject of personnel selection gives the political element equal billing with job competence. In the global operations field political attitude and reliability are undoubtedly primary. However, it is difficult to know precisely what this means in practice. Party officials would like to make it mean at least some minimum understanding of the currently accepted official interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and a degree of active participation in afterhours party work. Most professionals, however, view afterhours party work as an onerous duty and find the study of Marxism-Leninism exceedingly boring. The result is that in a large percentage of cases the "political" qualification consists of little more than party membership—which, except for a few top scientists, is an absolute requisite for upper echelon assignment—and an absence of derogatory information.

The minimum time-in-grade requirements act as a brake on too rapid advancement but do not prevent the assignment of outstanding individuals to more responsible work. A person can usually be assigned a position two or three grades above his current rank. He is then promoted just as rapidly as the minimum time-in-grade requirements permit and in the meantime he is paid the salary that goes with the position.

Thus far there appears to be no serious regulatory impediment in the way of better-than-average individuals rising to upper echelon positions and responsibilities. In the military establishment, however, and possibly also in other "national security" agencies, ceilings are imposed on the number of individuals in each rank. No individual can be promoted unless there is a vacancy in the next higher grade in the overall grade or rank structure. This restriction, although ensuring a proportionate distribution among the various ranks, tends to block the promotion of younger officers. Room can usually be made for the really outstanding individual but full utilization of many of the better-than-average is hindered by the retention of older officers whose qualifications may not be as good.

#### *Incentives*

Staffing in the global operations field, as in other areas of Soviet life, is accomplished through a mixture of direct allocation procedures—assignment and draft—and incentives. During the Stalin era the emphasis in all fields was on direct allocation and restrictive control over job mobility. In recent years, however, the regime has shifted to greater dependence on incentive evidently believing that this gives better results in morale and efficiency than authoritarian placement. The state now depends on manipulation of incentives, coupled with extensive use of propaganda and indirect pressures, to take care of the greater part of its manpower allocation problem. Assignment still plays an important role, however—in the initial placement of most graduates of higher educational institutions, in filling "undesirable" positions, and in staffing executive echelons and critical functions. Information on the relative weight of assignment and incentive is lacking but it is clear that motivational factors are important considerations whether an individual is assigned a position or seeks it on his own.

Psychological incentives for work in the "national security" departments and agencies appear to be quite strong in the Soviet Union. The diplomatic, intelligence, and military (officer level) services have

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an aura of status and prestige, and they offer the lure of intrigue, travel, and stirring achievement, and a sense of close participation in the most important and critical of state functions. Patriotic motivations are strong and are assiduously cultivated.

High material rewards buttress and reinforce the psychological incentives. For comparable work, salaries in the military, diplomatic, and intelligence fields may run as high as 20 percent greater than in less critical fields. This advantage is shared with a number of agencies—such as Gosplan, for instance—which are also considered of “exceptional significance.” Although comparisons are difficult due to the different nature of work, some fields—the scientific and the creative arts—may even offer material advantages in excess of those enjoyed by the “national security” agencies. Nevertheless, the professional entering the “national security” field can look forward to a life relatively free of the financial worries that plague most Soviet citizens.

A career in this field offers other material advantages as well. Assignments within the Soviet Union are likely to be in or near Moscow, Leningrad, or the other urban centers where amenities and cultural advantages are to be found and where food and consumer goods are in greater supply. Another strong incentive is the likelihood of foreign assignment and the opportunity for obtaining Western goods. Other benefits include prospects for better housing and educational advantages for self and children.

Sharply differentiated salaries within the agencies provide strong motivation for job performance and improvement of qualifications leading to promotion. A Soviet graduate beginning a career in one of the “national security” agencies, for example, has an opportunity for a salary increase of nine or ten times his entrance salary. Salaries for most officials in military, diplomatic, and intelligence work, scientific research and development, and a few other fields as well consist of two elements. There is rank pay, intended as compensation for education, experience, etc., and appointment pay which varies according to the specific type of duty performed. The income is the sum of the two. In the military and possibly also in the other services, pay is also given for length of service. In addition, recognition of specific personal qualifications can be made in the form of a “personal salary” determined on an individual basis by the appropriate department or agency with specific approval of the Council of Ministers. The personal salary is a major source of the largest wage differentials, and can mean an increase of up to 50 percent of salary.

Moreover, upper echelon positions carry perquisites which may mean more than salary increases. Preferred housing, exemption from restrictions on the amount of living space allowed per person, a *dacha* (country house), greater opportunity for vacations at lavish resorts, chauffeur driven limousine or private car, preferred medical care, and priority rights for scarce consumer goods are among the more important of these rewards. The net result is a fiercely competitive situation between individuals for advancement.

Orders, honorary titles, and other signs of official recognition are also used to reward outstanding public servants. Security requirements, however, by restricting publicity tend to reduce the effectiveness of this type of incentive.

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C. STAFFING FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Prior to April 1960, when the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research was established, administration of scientific research and development activities was diffuse and coordination difficult.<sup>1</sup> The U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, directly and through the academies of the various Soviet republics, supervised or coordinated the work of less than a third of the Soviet establishments engaged in scientific research. Research carried out at higher educational institutions was only loosely coordinated by the Scientific-Technical Council of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. The remaining research and development establishments—almost half the total—were engaged in narrowly departmental or special research and were widely scattered among state committees, ministries, and other administrative agencies.

An attempt was made in 1957-1958 to provide some measure of unified control over these latter by transferring many of the major industrial research and development institutes to the jurisdiction of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), which was in the process of becoming more an industrial coordinating body than a planning agency.<sup>2</sup> Gosplan, together with the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, was also given authority to participate with the branch-of-industry state committees, such as Aviation Engineering, and Defense Technology, in setting areas of research responsibility and coordinating objectives.

Still another agency figured in the regime's efforts to make more effective use of research and development activity. In 1955 a State Committee on Science and Technology (renamed State Scientific-Technical Committee in 1957) was created to push the use of new technological and scientific discoveries in industrial and economic activities. The committee was an attempt to bridge the serious gap that existed between discovery and utilization, but its powers were not equal to the task. It had no authority over research and development institutions and could not of itself more than scratch the surface in searching out applications for new technology. Moreover, it had only limited powers of persuasion in trying to get technological advances adopted by industrial managers who were all too reluctant to experiment with anything that might possibly disrupt production.

Khrushchev had told the 20th Communist Party Congress in February 1956 what had to be done:

The separation of the research activities of the Academy of Sciences, the departmental research institutes and higher educational establishments can no longer be tolerated. This separation and lack of coordination prevent the concentration of research activity on the solution of major scientific and technological problems, lead to duplication of effort and waste of resources, and slow up the introduction of research and technological achievements into production.

<sup>1</sup> This is not intended to imply that formation of the committee automatically changed this situation.  
<sup>2</sup> The development of state plans was assigned to the State Economic Council (*Goskomsobor*). In November 1962 *Goskomsobor* was reorganized somewhat and renamed Gosplan, and the old Gosplan was reorganized and titled U.S.S.R. Sovnarkhoz.

It was clear five years later that only limited progress had been made. There were still considerable duplication of effort and significant gaps in research and development. Much research potential was being dissipated on projects not directly related to tasks of greatest practical importance to the national economy, while massive high-priority programs, such as atomic energy, space research, and missile development, were consuming research and development resources at an alarming rate.

The pre-1961 institutional setup posed still another, though related, problem. Scientific research and development was playing an increasingly crucial role in policymaking, not only in the immediate area of international strategic interests but also in other fields of national life. Yet there nowhere existed a source of information and advice on scientific-technological matters which could focus perspective on the whole of Soviet scientific capabilities and achievements. Each of the existing institutions, with possibly one exception, had parochial interests of a nature which made the dispassionate objectivity of advice emanating from them open to question. The burden of achieving an overall view of the scientific research picture was thrust upon either the government Presidium or the party Presidium, bodies which in view of the range of their responsibilities were ill-suited to perform that function.

The possible exception referred to above was the Department for Science, Higher Educational Institutions and Schools in the executive staff of the party Secretariat. This department was responsible *inter alia* for checking on the operations of the scientific academies and institutions of higher learning, gathering and processing information, preparing reports and staff studies, and recommending courses of action in the scientific field. The department's responsibilities, however, do not seem to have extended to the research and development establishments maintained by the state committees or industrial undertakings. The staff department—Defense Industry, Machine Building, Planning, Finance, and Trade, etc.—responsible for the operations of the parent agency in each case presumably checked on its research institutes as well. There were other reasons, too, why the Science, Higher Educational Institutions and Schools Department was not wholly adequate for assisting the top Soviet leaders in making decisions in which science and technology were intimately involved. Among these were the limited size of its staff and its primary orientation as an investigative-control agency. Moreover, it was an agency in the Party chain of command which made for an awkward administrative situation when a particular question was being discussed in the government Presidium. The department nevertheless played a crucial role in advising and helping carry out the reorganization and restaffing of Soviet scientific and technological research and development activity.<sup>3</sup>

The U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences was a troublesome problem from the very beginning of Khrushchev's campaign to centralize the administration of Soviet research activity. Several factors seemed to make the academy the logical choice for the "general staff" of Soviet science. It had a prestige and record of accomplishment unmatched by any other institution in Soviet society. Among its members were

<sup>3</sup> The department was apparently reduced in status in the November 1962 reorganization of the party Secretariat and made a part of the new Ideological Department. Nothing is known of any changes in function which may have accompanied that move.

the brightest stars in the Soviet scientific firmament, many of them with international reputations. It had many years of experience in both pure and applied science.

It seems doubtful, however, that Khrushchev ever seriously considered the Academy for the centralizing role. It was too independent, for one thing, too detached and relatively immune from normal political and administrative pressures. The U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, in fact, is a real anachronism in Soviet society. It is nominally accountable to the Council of Ministers but adds to its membership and chooses its officers and directing boards by election which, though by no means free from external political pressures, have been nevertheless about the only elections in the country with any real substance. These factors did not make the Academy particularly appealing as an agency for interdepartmental coordination and control. Also, the Academy for many years enjoyed the privilege of independently preparing and carrying out its own plan of work<sup>4</sup> and Khrushchev was apparently convinced that research scientists when left to their own devices tended to go off on tangents of their own, that their interests often bore little or no relation to the immediate needs, aims and objectives of the state, and that they were therefore poor choices for determining what direction research should take. One academician was probably echoing Khrushchev's point of view when he wrote:

I have in the past compared some of our institutes to states of the early feudal epoch, consisting of separate small fiefs—laboratories. In a laboratory of this kind, the director and all the scientists, too, live very comfortably. Each works on his little individual scientific garden and his biggest fear in the world is that someone will force him to change his program.

A quiet and peaceful life in the conditions of extremely narrow specialization with a complete lack of interest in what his neighbor is doing—that, unfortunately, represents a fairly widespread picture in some of our institutes. In these conditions, to make great discoveries is about as difficult as to buy, shall we say, Aladdin's lamp or a magic wand in a Moscow store. In such cases, one cannot expect people willingly to take the risk of broadly selecting a new theme or even to display sufficient steadfastness to make a path for his own proposition if its scope goes beyond the framework of his own laboratory.

Yet it was precisely because the solution of the great research and development problems confronting the state required the coordinated and integrated activities of many scientists, engineers, and designers in many different types of activities, that the regime sought restructuring and restaffing in the research and development field.

On the other hand, the regime realized that any precipitate attack on the traditions and prerogatives of the academy ran the danger of creating serious dissension in the scientific community and of weakening the research and development effort. It took five years of discussion and pressure before the regime felt confident enough to establish a coordinating and controlling authority.

<sup>4</sup> The overall economic plan for the country, of course, placed some broad limits on the academy's freedom in this regard, and the academy's program was subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers, but this latter tended to be largely a matter of form.

Khrushchev apparently assigned the task of working out and carrying through on the reform to an able team of party, industrial, and scientific-research administrators which included V. A. Kirillin, the head of the Department for Science, Higher Educational Institutions and Schools, and A. V. Topchiyev, then the chief Scientific Secretary of the Academy of Sciences.<sup>5</sup> Both of these men had solid scientific achievements to their credit and they were clever organizers and exceptionally competent proponents of regime policies in the scientific field. In late 1957 or 1958, Presidium member A. N. Kosygin<sup>6</sup> was added to the team and the final shape of the reform probably owes much to his influence. Kosygin was probably selected for the job in order to bring the industrial manager point of view to bear on the problem and to give the team the added weight and prestige of a top leader. His whole career had been concerned with Soviet industry and since 1940 he had dealt with a broad spectrum of industrial planning and administrative activity as one of the top industrial executives in the country. He was made a candidate member of the party Presidium and a Deputy Premier in mid-1957; in March 1959 he assumed charge of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan).

The basic work of the team finally reached fruition when on April 8, 1961, the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research was created. The new committee absorbed the functions and staff of the State Scientific-Technical Committee, and at the same time was given broad responsibilities for supervising and planning the whole of the Soviet scientific effort. For the first time in Soviet history a central agency was in existence for coordinating scientific research and development activity throughout the entire country.

The State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research was made responsible for—

1. Determining the key areas for research and development work and defining the most important problems for immediate and for long-term research;
2. Drafting an overall plan for scientific research and development;
3. Supervising the implementation of key problem research regardless of the subordination of the institutions involved;
4. Coordinating research and development activities in regard to major projects of all institutions or agencies engaged in scientific research;
5. Introducing new technology throughout the country;
6. Authorizing establishment of new scientific research institutions, regardless of subordination;
7. Coordinating international relations of all governmental and scientific bodies in the scientific field;
8. Supervising the dissemination of scientific and technical information;
9. Advising the Council of Ministers on all problems and issues which in any way involve scientific research and development work.

<sup>5</sup> Topchiyev was promoted to Vice President of the Academy in 1958. He died in December 1962 and Kirillin was elected to the vacancy in February 1963.

<sup>6</sup> Kosygin became a candidate member of the party Presidium in June 1957 and a full member in May 1960.



The committee thus was given broad executive and advisory functions but it was not to perform any of the actual research or development work. To buttress the committee's authority in inter-departmental coordination and supervision and to ensure that the committee's views were brought to bear in decisionmaking at the highest level of government, the committee was given inner-cabinet status, i.e., its chairman was simultaneously appointed Deputy Premier, thus giving him a seat on the government Presidium.

Some idea of the approach to staffing an agency which not only has broad authority but also must deal with a great variety of complex technical problems cutting across established departmental lines can be gleaned from an examination of the way in which the coordination committee was staffed.

The man chosen to head the new committee, M. V. Khrunichev, was an able administrator with experience in the defense industry and atomic energy fields where cooperation between science and industry had been conspicuously successful. He was well known to Kosygin, with whom he had worked closely at various times. Since March 1959 he had been Kosygin's deputy in Gosplan. Khrunichev died of a heart attack only two months after his appointment and was succeeded by K. N. Rudnev, who has seen the committee through nearly the first two years of its existence. Rudnev had been chairman of the State Committee for Defense Technology and, like Khrunichev, had been a Deputy Minister of Defense Industry. He appears to have been involved in the guided weapons and space research programs.

The committee itself is something of an administrative hybrid. The enacting legislation designated a number of *ex officio* members—the President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, the Chairman of the State Committee on Automation and Machine Building, the Chairman of the State Committee for Chemistry, the Chairman of the Committee on Inventions and Discoveries, a deputy chairman<sup>7</sup> of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), and a deputy chairman<sup>8</sup> of the State Economic Council (now defunct)—and there may from time to time be other similarly "outside" members not directly subject to the chairman's administrative control. In addition, the committee in usual Soviet fashion includes the chairman's deputies and the heads of the more important departments of the committee's permanent staff. These latter positions were staffed for the most part with scientists, engineers, and technologists who had had previous experience in administrative positions in other government agencies. Kosygin obviously had a strong voice in their selection. His son-in-law, G. M. Gvishiani, has been a member of the committee since its creation, first as head of its foreign relations department—a quasi-diplomatic post—and then as a deputy chairman.

The exact size of the committee is not known so no estimate of the relative balance between the "outsiders" and the "staffers" is possible. There would seem to be little likelihood, however, of much community of interest among the outsiders which would unite their votes against the others. The main purpose in constituting the committee in the above fashion seems to have been to afford a respectable

<sup>7</sup> The chairmen of Gosplan and of Goskondomsvet, like the chairman of the Coordinating Committee, were Deputy Premiers. Their presence on the coordinating committee would have tended to weaken the authority of its chairman.

<sup>8</sup> Id.

hearing for departmental points of view, but in a forum where those points of view could neither dominate nor for long delay the reaching of decisions.

The committee has a permanent staff of 400 to 500 people a good many of whom came to it from the State Scientific-Technical Committee when it was abolished. A considerable amount of work, however, is done through ad hoc commissions and councils comprised of scientists, engineers, and technicians drawn from various sectors of the scientific community and "loaned" to the committee for a specific task. These commissions and councils study particular scientific and technical problems or fields of science and technology and make recommendations to the appropriate departments in the staff of the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research.

Individuals to staff the ad hoc committees and councils may be requested by name from various scientific institutes, the Academy of Sciences, or educational institutions, or such organizations may be asked to name their own representatives. The secretariats for the ad hoc commissions are provided by the permanent staff of the coordinating committee.

More fundamental problems are tackled by relatively permanent "scientific councils" whose members are nominated by the various agencies engaged in scientific research and development work. About fifty key problems for nationwide coordination and inclusion in the national plan for scientific research have been selected and assigned priority ratings. Among the subjects specified as being of major importance for the development of science, technology, and industry are solid-state physics; the creation of new methods of mining coal, ore, and other useful minerals; the scientific basis of planning and organizing production; cybernetics; and study of the oceans and seas and utilization of their resources. The scientific councils for coordinating research on these problems on a national scale are staffed on an interdepartmental basis. A little over half of them are supervised directly by the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research. The remainder are supervised by the Academy of Sciences.

By early 1962 there were in these councils about 2,000 scientists, including over 400 academicians and corresponding members of the various Academies of Sciences, more than 800 doctors and candidates of science, the top officials of the principal scientific research establishments, and representatives of the planning agencies, ministries, and other government departments. Altogether about 7,000 scientists and specialists were involved at that time in the councils, their subsections, and commissions.

The regime's choice to replace A. N. Nesmeyanov as President of the Academy was M. V. Keldysh, a member of the Academy's Presidium since 1953 who like both Khrushchev and Rudnev, the successive heads of the new coordination committee, had had wide organizational experience with the large-scale research and development effort outside the Academy. Keldysh, in fact, had worked in research organizations headed by Khrushchev and he seems to have worked with Rudnev on the guided weapons program. Moreover, he had done his major research work in institutes outside the Academy's jurisdiction. The death of one of the Academy's Vice Presidents in January 1960 created the opportunity and Keldysh was maneuvered

into the post of Vice President of the Academy in February 1960 in apparent anticipation of his assuming the presidency when Nesmeyanov's term ended.

The Academy, as mentioned earlier, has achieved and maintained a considerable degree of independence from the usual administrative pressures and restrictions. Its independence in coordination and planning functions has been restricted by the superior authority of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research and the Academy is subject, of course, to governmental budgetary controls, but it determines, within broad limits, its own internal organization and procedures, and its administrative and policymaking personnel, instead of being appointed by the government, are with one exception elected by the General Assembly of the Academy from among its members. The Academy also exercises wide freedom of choice in adding to its own membership.

The main administrative and policymaking body of the Academy is the Presidium, consisting of the President of the Academy, the Vice Presidents, the Chief Scientific Secretary, the Academician Secretaries of the Academy's departments, and a few other members who may be heads of departments or institutes of the Academy or important scientist-administrators (but Academy members) from other government agencies. The size of the Presidium is determined by the General Assembly; currently it is set at 28 members. The one officer not elected by the General Assembly is the Chief Scientific Secretary. He is the official representative of the Party and his position is formalized by the Presidium rather than the General Assembly of the Academy.

The Chief Scientific Secretary, assisted by five assistant secretaries, is responsible for looking after the Party's interests from within the Academy. The Scientific Secretariat formerly worked in close conjunction with the Party's Department for Science, Higher Educational Institutions and Schools and presumably will maintain a similar relationship with the successor unit to that department. The division of function between the Scientific Secretariat and the Party unit is not clear since there appears to be considerable overlap. In the staffing field, for example, both groups pass on the security and political reliability and general suitability of an individual for membership in the academy or for a position within any of the Academy's organizational components including research institutes.

Soviet scientists become members of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences through election held annually by the General Assembly of the Academy. Nominations for membership are made by organizations and by fellow scientists presumably with some prior assurance that the nominee will not be rejected by the Party. Soviet scientists are urged to join the Party but Party membership is not a requirement for advancement to leading scientific positions. Normally each nominee will be "sponsored" by a number of organizations and individuals; most of the time there is more than one nominee for each vacancy. The members of the Academy presumably choose among the nominees on the basis of personal acquaintance and professional reputation. The most outstanding Soviet scientists and scholars in all fields of knowledge, whether working in the Academy's institutes or elsewhere, are selected for membership. Occasionally outside political pressure will be brought to bear to ensure the election of a

scientist favored by the regime. This does not ordinarily create serious dissention because the academicians are used to and expect some amount of pressure, particularly in the social science and biological science fields where doctrinal orthodoxy is an ever present problem.

There are two classes of membership, academicians and corresponding members. The number of each is set by the Council of Ministers. Currently there are 176 academicians and 364 corresponding members. Election as academician is the higher honor and carries with it full voting rights. Members enjoy certain perquisites and emoluments which, added to the honor, make election to the Academy a much coveted distinction. Among these are preferred housing, a chauffeur driven automobile, special commissary privileges, and a substantial stipend. The membership is about equally divided between research institutions of the Academy and outside research or educational institutions on the same basis as other staff personnel, i.e., by competitive examination, and they are paid the established salary in addition to their stipend as a member of the Academy.

Membership in the Academy is for life unless terminated by action of the General Assembly. This provision affords a member considerable security since the Academy has been noticeably reluctant to eject members. Shepilov, who was politically disgraced and publicly vilified as a member of the antiparty group in July 1957, was not deprived of his membership until March 1959. This "protectionist" attitude also finds expression in the operation of the advancement and promotion system within the scientific community.

The Academy, like other national research organizations, has been faced for some time with the serious problem of rejuvenation. A predilection to promote on the basis of seniority rather than merit has permitted older scientists to monopolize senior-level positions, even after their health had failed or they had lost touch with the mainstream of scientific advances. An attempt to solve the problem by instituting regular competitive examinations for occupied posts failed because scientists generally took the view that it was unethical to try to displace a colleague in this way, and consequently only the incumbent would apply.

The continued reliance on older scientists for staffing the higher positions does not mean that younger men are not available. As a matter of fact, the steadily increasing supply of competent young scientists in relation to the limited number of vacancies occurring in the more responsible positions has made the problem of creating opportunities for advancement particularly acute. The average age of all scientists has dropped from 41.5 years in 1950 to 38 years in 1960, and the ratio of junior research scientists to others increased from 2 out of every 3 in 1955 to 4 out of every 5 in 1960.

Awareness of the seriousness of the problems of advancing young scientists led the Soviet leaders to take several measures. A joint party-government decree promulgated in May 1962 sets 65 as the compulsory retirement age for senior supervisory positions in academies of sciences, research institutes, and higher educational institutions. The positions affected include those of directors and deputy directors of institutions, rectors and assistant rectors of higher educational institutions, deans of faculties, and heads of departments and sections. Authority to exempt individual scientists from mandatory

retirement is vested in academy presidia and ministerial collegia. This measure could help alleviate the promotion pressures but only if the exemption provision is not abused.

The decree also dealt with the problem of how to utilize the capabilities of senior scientists who reach the retirement age. It provided for the establishment of positions of "senior scientific colleague-consultant" at research institutions, to be filled from among scientists with a doctor's degree or title of professor who are eligible for retirement. The efforts of scientists assigned to these positions are to be devoted primarily to the training of new personnel. According to Topchiyev, who had earlier proposed creating such positions, they would help "to combine properly the activities of deserving elder workers with the timely advancement of talented young ones and to develop from the energetic organizers of the latter group a truly efficient scientific body."

The regime has also sought to increase the number of responsible positions available by attempting to curtail the practice of multiple-job-holding, whereby one scientist holds several positions simultaneously. Last year, 103 academicians held 1,037 jobs. This practice developed at a time when there were not enough experienced scientists in the U.S.S.R. to provide leadership for the rapidly expanding number of research and higher educational institutions. It has continued for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are inertia and the reluctance of established scientists to give up the added income, prestige, and power which the practice affords them. A growing number of eminent scientists in the Academy, however, have been criticizing the practice on the grounds that it forces them to spread themselves too thin and that they are overburdened.

The case of Doctor Anatoly A. Dorodnitsyn, an eminent aero and gas dynamics specialist, clearly illustrates the situation. He has held the following full- and part-time positions simultaneously:

1. Head, Department of Gas Dynamics, Moscow Physico-Technical Institute;
2. Member, Zhukovsky Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute;
3. Director, Computer Center, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences;
4. Chairman, Commission on Computing Techniques, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences;
5. Member, Committee on Lenin Prizes in the Field of Science and Technology, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers;
6. Vice Chairman, International Computer Federation, sponsored by UNESCO;
7. Chairman, Committee on Automation and Instrument Construction, Higher Certification Commission;
8. Senior Scientific Associate, Steklov Mathematics Institute;
9. Chief Editor, *Journal of Computer Mathematics and Mathematical Physics*.

In 1959 the payment of basic salaries to the same man by more than one institution was prohibited and rules governing the amount of pay for additional part-time work were established. The 1962 figures cited above, however, indicate that multiple job holding is still a major factor in the staffing of scientific research and development activities. The regime, although deploring the adverse effects of the practice, recognizes that it does provide a means of cross communica-

tion that is essential for today's complex inter-disciplinary, inter-departmental research and design programs. Through judicious use of the "multiple-hat" system, scientists can coordinate isolated elements of research, development, training, and engineering, and mobilize scientific manpower into task forces for the solution of special problems. The regime seems at the present to be concerned more with controlling multiple-job-holding than with eliminating the practice altogether.

Personnel "hired" to staff research institutions are selected by competitive examinations. The appointments are for five years (three years for junior researchers). The ineffective periodic competition for occupied posts has been dropped in favor of a new procedure for taking stock of research personnel. At the end of each period of appointment, the researcher must be "reelected" to his position by the council of the institution. The decision is reached by secret ballot. If an individual fails of reelection his post is declared vacant and filled by competitive examination.

An additional means of selecting capable young scientists by research institutes and institutions of higher education was approved by the May 1962 decree. These institutions are now allowed, with the approval of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research, to add research trainees to their staffs within the limits of the general personnel schedule. The trainees, who must have had a higher education, may be appointed for terms of up to two years. Those who excel in scientific activities may be selected for permanent work in the research institution. The others are returned to their former places of work or assigned to government agencies in accordance with the established rules for placing graduates of higher educational institutions.

The reorganization of the Soviet scientific research and development effort clearly owes much to the outstanding successes scored in the fields of atomic energy, guided missiles, and space research—success attributed to the pooling of resources and the combined efforts of scientists, engineers, and designers. The emphasis on high-level coordination, close correlation of research with production, and on organizing-managerial talent for staffing the controlling echelons clearly reflects experience gained in the massive national security development programs. Unfortunately, the regime has enveloped those programs in a policy of strictest secrecy. Stringent security measures have formed a barrier to information on the staffing of the programs as well as other aspects. Only a few key personalities have been identified and little is known of the quantity or quality of manpower involved or of the way the massive effort is organized for the accomplishment of its mission.

It is apparent, however, that a major portion of the total Soviet research and development effort is being devoted to the complex high-priority scientific-military-industrial programs such as space research and guided missiles. These areas of research receive the best resources in terms of manpower, facilities, and equipment. Basic overall coordination among the various programs is probably performed by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, with the immediate responsibility for implementation of the programs vested in one or more of the Presidium members. What role the new scientific research coordination committee will play in the military oriented

programs is not yet clear. The signs at present do not point to more than a "participating" role in the coordination and direction of the work.

Executive authority for research, development, production, and construction is probably exercised by a special interagency commission composed of representatives of the Ministry of Defense, relevant state committees (e.g., Aviation Technology, Defense Technology, Radio-Electronics, Coordination of Scientific Research, etc.), planning organizations, and the Ministry of Finance. The commission presumably provides overall management for the program with authority to marshal the scientific and industrial resources required.

The U.S.S.R.'s space program and military missile program have been closely linked from their inception and it is probable that many of the scientists, engineers, and technicians work on both. According to Soviet Academician L. I. Sedov, a leading scientist and spokesman on aerospace matters, "There is one large team in Russia that handles all space projects. The same key men are in charge of guidance, tracking, and other segments for each of the projects. It is a very large team and it can well take care of several projects in parallel. \* \* \* We have no distinction between military and civilian projects."

Below the level of central executive control and coordination a wide variety of organizational components probably handle assigned portions of the work. There are undoubtedly a number of research-design institutes working exclusively on space vehicle and guided missile design development and fabrication. In addition, supporting projects are carried on in classified project sections of research establishments of the Academies of Sciences and higher educational institutions. The Chief Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense probably establishes military specifications for advanced weapons systems and oversees the launching and testing of vehicles.

#### CHAPTER IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM—AN APPRAISAL

Judgments as to the effectiveness of the Soviet mechanism and procedures for staffing functions must necessarily be heavily qualified. Despite the undoubtedly freer atmosphere developed in the post-Stalin period, the relaxation of many controls, and the opening of the country to foreign visitors, a curtain of secrecy still shrouds most of the system and is, of course, most dense about the agencies and functions that are closely connected with global policy interests. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Soviet authorities have only recently begun to exhibit interest in the idea of teaching government administration and management. They have not in the past considered these important subjects for study and investigation, and as a result have developed very little literature detailing and analyzing their own administrative principles and procedures. Some of the basic features (as outlined in the preceding chapters) can be pieced together from the scraps of information available but these are insufficient for any real depth of understanding of the system. Nevertheless, a few observations may be in order.

The strength of the Soviet challenge in the world today, when the complexities of national and international life are greater than ever before, is in itself a measure of the effectiveness of Soviet staffing. The previous study "National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union" (see above, footnote on p. 1) reached the conclusion that:

[The machinery on which the Soviet leaders depend for policy formulation] appears to provide well-defined and clearly structured processes for getting policy questions before the Presidium in digested and manageable form, and to combine with this a degree of flexibility which prevents these processes from becoming a limitation on the Presidium's own initiative. The success of the system appears to depend less on its machinery, however, than on the capacity and energy of the men who run it.

The Soviet system appears to have been generally successful in developing and raising competent, often superior, individuals to positions of leadership. The top leaders in Khrushchev's regime are a shrewd, tough minded bunch, experienced over a wide range of subjects and capable of handling complex problems of national policy with reasonable foresight and despatch. Each man on his way to the top has had to prove his worth in the crucible of deadly competition and is under continuing challenge to perform at peak capacity. The price of "failure" is no longer death or imprisonment, but in a society where private employment is almost nonexistent loss of high level position with its perquisites and privileges would appear to be a heavy enough price.

The nature of power in the Soviet Union—constantly subject to challenge, requiring daily maintenance, and shared only at great risk—



creates a serious problem, however, in securing the most effective staffing of critical functions. The job of running the country is becoming increasingly complex and difficult. The alternatives in policy issues are more numerous, and the interrelation of functions so intimate that decisions in one field have effects, often deadly serious, extending into diverse other fields. The problem of making intelligent choices is beyond the ability of any one man; it requires the combined efforts of many. Although Khrushchev uses the talent and experience of his top lieutenants to a far greater degree than Stalin did, it may be that that is not enough. Yet more effective use of these men would seem to require a delegation of power and authority that might ultimately endanger Khrushchev's own position.

On the positive side, however, the state has a virtual monopoly of employment and a highly centralized mechanism for selection and assignment of personnel. It can thus direct to the solution of critical operations the best the nation can produce in the way of superior, talented, competent, and experienced individuals. It is, of course, quite another problem to identify these individuals, to select the best man for a given job, to motivate him to superior performance, and to create organizational arrangements that will enable the greatest possible use to be made of his capabilities.

For identifying talented and capable individuals, providing the education, training, and work experience necessary for developing their abilities, and assigning them so as to make efficient use of their talents, skills, and experience, the staffing machinery appears to provide reasonably adequate processes. The quality of staffing in the middle and lower echelons and in the low priority fields is rather spotty and probably rates only poor to mediocre, but in respect to the upper echelon positions and the more critical functions, areas which receive the closest high-level attention, the staffing appears generally good.

Even in these areas, however, there are signs of weakness and ineffective techniques. The Soviet High Command, for example, is over age by U.S. standards. Eight of the twelve top military leaders are over 60 and the average age of all twelve is 61. The U.S. "High Command" averages about five years younger, and only two have reached 60. As a group, the Soviet marshals tend to take conservative positions on the question of new types of warfare and other problems in military doctrine. The retention of these older men in the leading positions blocks the promotion of the vigorous younger officers upon whom the country would probably have to rely in the event of global conflict, and presumably denies the younger men a fully effective voice in shaping the Soviet Armed Forces to meet the demands of tomorrow's war.

Lack of field coordination appears to be a serious weakness in the operation of Soviet missions abroad, since this places a heavy burden on communication facilities and headquarters staffs and occasionally leads to conflicts in activity. The constant need to check with Moscow on even the most trivial and mundane matters turns competent, knowledgeable diplomatic officers into little more than errand boys. And although the diplomat may later use his field experience at the policy desk in Moscow, there would seem to be considerable waste of talent involved. Trade and aid officers seem to have somewhat greater freedom than other foreign mission personnel in making field

decisions, probably because of the more technical nature of much of their work.

The extent of multiple-job-holding—because it stretches the scientist too thin—may indicate some dissipation of resources in the scientific research field, and there is reason to question whether there is not a larger number of laboratory assistants and other support personnel than is altogether desirable. The Soviet scientist of rank is spared physical work—handling instruments, putting plugs in sockets, etc.—the performance of which is looked down upon as being an evidence of low station. The presence of technicians to perform the routine and manual work in the laboratory facilitates the work of the scientist, and permits him to concentrate more exclusively on creative work rather than on details and procedures. For the scientist, however, there is a potential loss of insight that comes from working directly with instruments, animals, or data. In addition, a large staff has many problems related to supervision, direction, discipline, and morale. There may well be a critical point in the size of the laboratory support staff beyond which the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.

The U.S.S.R. still lacks enough generally capable individuals for staffing the middle and lower echelons of the administrative apparatus. The situation in this regard is improving with the steady expansion of education facilities and the efforts of the regime to promote promising young people to positions of responsibility but the needs of the state are far from being satisfied. The question might be raised, however, whether the Soviet regime is making most effective use of the able people it produces. There is little doubt but that it has been quite successful in concentrating its most capable individuals in the key leadership and other priority areas; but it may be that the effort to ensure adequate staffing in these areas has led to the assignment to them of more of the highly talented and capable individuals than they can use effectively. There is at least a hint that a number of individuals are being used in positions that do not permit full utilization of their capabilities, with promotions blocked by the presence of experienced personnel above them.

Overstaffing, a chronic problem in most bureaucracies, is especially marked in the Soviet Union. Nicholas DeWitt in his monumental study *Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R.*<sup>1</sup> notes that:

On the eve of Stalin's death, one of every seven Soviet workers and employees was administering or managing something or someone. During Khrushchev's administration, the managerial apparatus declined in size . . . and the proportion of managerial elite was reduced to one out of every ten workers and employees.

Even this sharp improvement leaves the Soviet Union saddled with proportionately one of the largest bureaucracies in the world.

Figures on which to judge the extent of overstaffing in the "national security" agencies are unavailable but there is no reason to assume that those agencies are wholly free of something that so clearly afflicts other agencies of the state. When the eminent Soviet engineer-physicist P. L. Kapitsa a few years ago returned to the Soviet Union

<sup>1</sup> National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.

from Great Britain and a new institute was established for him, he was assigned four bookkeepers for his staff, although the institute was relatively small. Exercising his authority as director, Kapitsa dismissed three of them. On being queried about his action, Kapitsa replied: "I would have dismissed more, but unfortunately a bookkeeper, like an integer, is indivisible."

The causes of this overstaffing are too complex to be completely sorted out here. Many are common to bureaucracies the world over; others are grounded in the nature of the Soviet political system. One of the continuing factors has been the short supply of competent individuals and the uncertainty of replacement which has led administrators to hoard personnel like other resources. Then, too, the lack of an individual competent enough to do a particular job has forced the supervisor to parcel it out among two or more persons to get it done. The administrative attitudes and habits which these factors have engendered over a long period of time continue, even though, as in some areas, there are now enough generally competent personnel available.

This last point is part of a broader problem of revitalizing the government and party to meet the growing complexity of today's problems. Overcoming the bureaucratic stagnation that had developed during the Stalinist period was the main thrust of the de-Stalinization campaign launched in 1956 and pushed in varying degree since then. Old attitudes and habits die hard, however, and the ultimate solution to the problem of overcoming the Stalinist legacy probably demands the replacement of the older generation of state officials with younger, more imaginative and dynamic ones. The regime has been reluctant to tackle the problem in such a radical fashion, however, being clearly unwilling to accept the full implications of such a move and fearful of its own ability to control the rate and direction of the change it would engender.

## APPENDIX: EDUCATION AND TRAINING

### A. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet regime, from its earliest days in power, realized that political, economic, and military goals would not be reached unless it had a highly trained manpower pool from which to draw specialists for staffing its global policy machinery. To train the specialists needed to bring about rapid industrialization, it was necessary to develop a broadly based education system, heavily oriented toward science and technology. After a short experiment with "progressive education," a conservative and highly competitive educational system began to emerge in the early 1930's. It remained substantially unchanged until the educational reforms initiated by Khrushchev in 1958. In addition to the regular educational system, there are a number of "special" schools (military, diplomatic, etc.) which train personnel for specific fields.

Soviet education has a number of distinctive features, the most prominent of which is its specialized and utilitarian character. Education in the Soviet Union is conceived as a tool for training a person to perform a specific and fairly narrow function in the national economy; in return for the training he receives, a graduate is under an obligation to serve the state in whatever capacity it sees fit. The concept of liberal education as it is known in this country does not exist. (European education in general is of course more specialized than it is in this country, but nowhere to such a degree as in the Soviet Union.)

Another characteristic of Soviet education is the centralized control which the regime exercises over all facets of educational policy, from the size of graduating classes down to textbooks. The regime uses the numerous controls and incentives at its disposal to attract needed talent to various specialties, and by virtue of its control can use the entire educational system as a flexible instrument for achieving its national goals.

By the same token, the regime attaches great importance to education and gives it generous financial support. Advancement through the Soviet educational system, in theory, and by and large in practice too, takes place solely on the basis of academic achievement. Tuition is free at all levels. Beyond the secondary school level, the large majority of students are given adequate, though not generous, stipends to cover living expenses.

### B. THE REGULAR SCHOOL SYSTEM

#### *Primary-Secondary Schools*

Soviet children start school at the age of seven and must complete at least eight years of schooling. (Until 1958 only seven years were required.) Continuation of schooling beyond the eighth grade is not automatic, but pupils who aspire to higher education and a specialist

status must pass through general secondary or eleven-year schools. After the eighth and eleventh grades, students must pass comprehensive written and oral state examinations; a pupil who fails at either level is removed from the academically oriented schools and is channelled into one of several alternatives: the labor force, a factory school, or a specialized secondary school (*tekhnikum*). Only the most academically able are permitted to continue general education. Approximately one-third of those who finish the eight-year school continue on through the general secondary school (grades eight-eleven), while one-fifth of those who graduate from secondary school continue to full-time higher education.

With the exception of some experimental schools to be discussed below, the basic curriculum in all general secondary schools is the same, although the quality of teaching varies tremendously. Scientific and technical subjects are heavily emphasized and the curriculum includes eleven years of mathematics, five years each of biology and chemistry, and six years of physics. Foreign language study is mandatory beginning with the fifth grade. The most widely studied languages are German, English, and French in that order. Recently educational authorities have substituted in selected schools the study of such "exotic" languages as Chinese, Hindi, and Arabic beginning in some cases with the second grade. Teaching in Soviet secondary schools is done principally through lectures. Much emphasis is placed on repetition, drill, and review; homework assignments are heavy.

The 1958 educational reform brought one major change in the secondary school system, the full effects of which cannot yet be assessed. Labor training was introduced in the top three grades, thus reducing by one-third the time devoted to academic subjects. Many Soviet educators feel that this has already lowered the quality of secondary school graduates.

#### *Selection of Talented Students for Higher Education*

The problem of selecting the most capable and talented secondary school graduates for higher education--and ultimately for key national positions--is in some respects a new one for Soviet authorities and one to which they are currently giving much thought. In the past, virtually all ten-year school graduates were accepted into higher education institutions (VUZes).<sup>1</sup> By 1958, however, only one out of five could hope for admission to a VUZ. The pressure of applicants, as well as certain problems raised by the 1958 reform, have made the selection and training of talent an urgent question.

In addition to the introduction of labor training in secondary schools and the corresponding decrease in the time allotted to academic subjects, the 1958 reform made it mandatory for secondary school graduates to work at a job for two years before admission to the VUZ. Moreover, a student once admitted to a VUZ must spend a certain amount of his first two years working in production. The reform also gave greater weight to extra-academic criteria in admissions policy--Komsomol recommendations, character references, work experience--than had been the case in the past. Although a certain percentage of the most talented students in scientific fields are exempted from these requirements, many Soviet educators feel that the level of

<sup>1</sup> VUZ is the common Russian abbreviation for "Higher Educational Institution."

preparation of an entering class has become noticeably lower over the past few years.

Both to combat these problems and to improve selection procedures, Soviet authorities have conducted a wide variety of pedagogical experiments, some of which may be adopted on a wider basis.

One such experiment was the establishment of several secondary schools with differentiated curricula. Beginning with the ninth grade, these schools offer students an opportunity to specialize in one of three fields: physics and mathematics; chemistry and biology; or the humanities. Students are thus given more intensive training in the field of their future specialty. These experimental schools have apparently found wide approval among educators and there is evidence that more may be set up.

Various other experiments are intended to provide training in mathematics and science to supplement the regular secondary school curriculum. The Mathematical Youth Schools, for example, which are sponsored by the VUZes, conduct two-hour evening classes in advanced mathematics twice a week. Eventually, they will provide a reservoir of mathematical talent from which universities and institutes may draw the most promising for further study.

The so-called "science circles" (extracurricular clubs) perform a similar function, particularly the mathematics and physics circles, which attract the scientifically gifted and to which Soviet authorities attach great importance. In addition to providing supplementary training in scientific topics, the circles also sponsor annual scientific contests (*olympiads*) which are open to pupils in grades seven through eleven. By means of the contest, talented students are spotted early and are encouraged to continue their studies in mathematics and the sciences. Some are selected for additional out-of-school study under the guidance of a university student and are later tapped by the universities for higher education.

An interesting experiment connected with the olympiads was initiated last year by the Siberian branch of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk. The winners and runners-up of the Siberian Olympiad in Mathematics and Physics were brought to a summer school organized by the Academy, where they attended lectures given by scientists from the Academy and worked in the research laboratories. Some students who showed promise but had been poorly prepared were thus enabled to enter Novosibirsk University at the end of the summer. Other younger students were admitted to a special four-year boarding school under the auspices of the Academy where they are being given intensified training in physics and mathematics. By the time they enter the university, it is hoped that they will have attained the level of a graduate student; by the time they graduate, they will be full-fledged scientists. Judging from the success of this experiment, similar schools providing highly specialized and intensified training for a potential scientific elite may be established elsewhere.

One other type of specialized school which deserves mention is the special language school where instruction in some subjects is conducted entirely in a foreign language—usually German, French, or English. At one such school in Moscow, for example, one-fifth of the total instruction is given in English. These schools, which now number between 20 and 30, are apparently considered to have been

quite successful. Many of the students who graduate from these schools are apparently recruited subsequently for further language study at a higher educational institution or at a special diplomatic school, and ultimately may end up in work connected with Soviet operations abroad.

*Access to Higher Education and Choice of Specialty*

In seeking admission to a higher educational institution, a Soviet secondary school student applies to a particular department within the institution (e.g., the department of chemistry at Moscow State University) rather than the institution itself. Consequently, his specialty and his future profession must be firmly decided on by the time he enters a VUZ. His choice will be influenced by a variety of factors, many of which are carefully manipulated by the state. Since many key national policy positions require personnel with scientific or technical training, recruitment and selection procedures for higher education reflect a definite scientific and technical bias.

Operating from estimates of the state's future needs, each VUZ and each department within a VUZ sets up a quota for accepting new entrants. A student, in making his choice of specialty, considers the quota system and applies for the faculty where he believes his chances for acceptance are greatest. In addition, the entrance exam which is made up by each VUZ ensures that the better students are channelled into the needed specialties and the better VUZes. Stipend rates are manipulated to channel students into specialties needed by the economy. They are higher, for example, for scientific and technical students than for history or philosophy students. The regime, in extreme cases, uses more direct methods of placing students in specialties, such as transferring an entire class of students from one department to another. Authorities have also used military draft exemptions and deferments to lure students into needed faculties. Even during World War II, students in some 85 high priority specialties were given draft exemptions as long as their academic work remained satisfactory.

Access to higher education in the Soviet Union and choice of specialty are dependent to some extent on sociological factors, such as place of residence and nationality. Because, for instance, the level of secondary school education is far lower in rural areas than in the cities, most VUZ students tend to be of urban origin. Higher educational opportunity is greater in the Russian republic (RSFSR) than elsewhere; in 1958, for example, Moscow and Leningrad alone accounted for 20 percent of that year's graduates. Despite impressive progress over the past 20 years, few Soviet nationalities have as high a percentage of VUZ graduates as do the Russians, although Armenians, Georgians, and Jews are as well or better represented. Many Soviet VUZes, particularly the older ones, have nationality and geographic quotas based on population. Although nationality may be one of several factors affecting a student's access to higher education, discrimination as such cannot be said to exist at the VUZ level. However, because it does exist at a career level, nationality may influence a student's choice of specialty; for example, many Jews are to be found in scientific and academic fields largely because there is less discrimination in those areas than in party, government, or managerial jobs.

Despite official policy, social origin is to some extent a limiting factor. During the early Soviet period, the regime made extensive efforts to enroll students of proletarian (e.g., worker or peasant) origin, and applicants of nonproletarian origin were often discriminated against. However, in 1935 these restrictions were abolished and by 1958 less than 40 percent of the VUZ students were children of workers or peasants. The 1958 reform is attempting once again to increase the percentage of proletarian enrollment.

Access to higher education in the U.S.S.R. is not influenced by a person's sex. In 1960, 43 percent of the students enrolled in higher educational institutions were women—a higher percentage than in any other country. As in the case of nationality, discrimination exists at the career rather than the VUZ level; women are rarely found in top positions, although more often than their U.S. counterparts. Teaching and medicine are traditionally women's fields in the Soviet Union partly because the low wages fail to attract men and partly because such jobs tend to be more convenient and compatible with family obligations.

#### *Higher Education*

Higher education is offered at two types of institutions: institutes and universities. A secondary school student applies to a department within the institution and is required to take a competitive entrance examination which is made up by the institute or university. (Until 1958 honors secondary school graduates were exempted from the exam.) The exam results must be supplemented by recommendations from the teachers and Komsomol organizations. If accepted, the student will probably be given a stipend to defray living expenses (80 percent of all VUZ students are so subsidized); tuition is free.

The institutes, which are far more numerous than the universities, usually consist of four or five closely related departments and offer highly specialized training of an applied nature. Such specialization has always been a prominent feature of Soviet education, and in the past was carried to excess. This was partly due to the requirements of rapid industrialization in the early Soviet period when narrowly trained engineers and other specialists were badly needed. Now, however, excessive specialization has been found to be something of a liability and since 1957 the specialties have considerably broadened, although they remain narrow compared with higher education in this country.

University programs, as opposed to institute training, have always been broadly conceived. For example, it is only in the 40 universities that a student can major in physics, chemistry, mathematics, philology, etc. Though the institutes often offer excellent training in these subjects, they are taught as "tool" subjects and not as major disciplines.

VUZ training lasts from five to six years, depending on a student's specialty. As in the case of the lower schools, emphasis is on the memorization and absorption of facts and figures. In their final year all students must prepare a thesis, known as a "diploma project," and students must undertake a "practice assignment" in a factory, laboratory, or school for six months to collect data for the diploma project. The projects afford staffing authorities with information about the student's abilities and interests.



The quality of training in the Soviet Union varies greatly according to the individual institution and the field of specialty. University training is generally of good quality, and as a rule, the older established institutes in the big cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov) offer training of high quality. VUZes devoted to high priority subjects (machine building, chemical technology) are usually superior to those with a low priority specialty (food technology, textile design).

#### *Postgraduate Study*

Although graduate study in the Soviet Union—as in this country—is geared primarily to the training of advanced research and academic personnel, an advanced degree is needed for certain high policy positions, particularly in scientific and technical areas. Although Soviet graduate training is in some respects similar to that in this country, there is one important difference. Advanced degrees are not a prerequisite for teaching and research slots in the Soviet Union, but are frequently awarded after appointment to academic rank or to a teaching position; consequently, Soviet graduate students tend to be older than their U.S. counterparts. (In the postwar period, the median age of degree recipients was 38.) Advanced degrees may, in some cases, be conferred in recognition of outstanding research accomplishment and thus serve as supplemental criteria of performance.

There are two graduate degrees in the Soviet Union: the *kandidat* degree, which is awarded after a three-year training program known as the *aspirantura*; and the doctoral degree—usually awarded at a considerably later point in the career, following defense of a doctoral dissertation, which, at least in theory, should represent a major research contribution. Graduate training is offered only at certain approved VUZes and at research institutes connected with economic ministries, *sovnarkhozes* (national economic councils) and the academies of science.

Competition at the graduate level is stiff. All applicants for *aspirantura* training must take an entrance examination and their past academic records are reviewed. Extra-academic criteria, such as Komsomol recommendations, are also given some consideration. Until last year, only students who had completed two years of work in industry or teaching were accepted for advanced training, but this requirement has now been abolished. As in the case of undergraduate training, tuition is free and students are given a stipend of up to 100 rubles per month.

In theory, *aspirantura* training, leading to the award of the *kandidat* degree, lasts three years, but in practice it often takes considerably longer. Students are not required to pursue a standard program of courses, but instead work out an individual study program with their academic advisors. After a year and a half of studying his specialty, an *aspirant* takes qualifying examinations (*kandidat minimum*) in his specialty, a foreign language, and Marxism-Leninism. When he has passed the examinations, a student is considered to have finished his *aspirantura* training, and many terminate their graduate studies at this point. In order to obtain the formal degree of *kandidat*, however, a student must write and defend a dissertation, which usually takes at least a year and a half longer.

Formal enrollment in a VUZ is not required to obtain the *kandidat* degree. Many students proceed independently at their place of work. When they feel prepared, they take the qualifying exams at an approved VUZ, and then prepare a dissertation.

In the physical and mathematical sciences, the *kandidat* degree generally compares favorably with a Ph. D. in this country. In engineering, the quality of training is uneven; in some cases the degree is equivalent to a Ph. D. while in others it rates no higher than an M.S.

Holders of the *kandidat* degree in science are absorbed into global policy operations in various ways. A student who has demonstrated excellent research potential is often retained by the institute where he earned the degree and frequently continues to work under the aegis of his scientific advisor. Other *kandidats* may be given research jobs in industrial institutes, particularly if their dissertation research has been sponsored and subsidized by the institutes either directly or under contract, or they may be recruited into military research establishments.

Of particular importance to Soviet operations in the foreign field are the area institutes under the Academy of Sciences, which are devoted to study of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviet Union's increasing interest in these areas in recent years has been reflected in a corresponding expansion of the institutes. In addition to the previously existing Oriental Institutes and the Institute of Sinology, an African Institute was established in 1960 and a Latin American Institute the following year. Their primary function is research, but in addition they train an impressive body of area specialists on which the regime can draw both for information and personnel.

### C. SPECIAL SCHOOLS

In addition to the regular school system described above, there are a wide variety of special schools which provide specialized training for personnel in various operations, be it military, intelligence, diplomatic, or simply agitation and propaganda functions.

Apart from their general function of training personnel for specific positions, these schools have certain common features which distinguish them from the "regular" schools.

First and foremost is the importance attached to political reliability in selecting students for special schools. Although a candidate's ability is certainly taken into consideration, political loyalty and zeal count for at least as much, if not more. Party membership is frequently a prerequisite for admission and a student must almost always be nominated by his party or Komsomol organization. (Political reliability is also a factor for admission to a regular VUZ, but it carries far less weight.)

In addition, experience in party work is the channel through which many students apparently gain admission to the special schools—although it is a prerequisite only for the party schools—and this inevitably affects the composition of the student body. It has frequently been noted that the party and Komsomol activists in the regular VUZ form a group quite distinct from the academically talented. This does not mean that the party or Komsomol workers are not able, but rather that their talents tend to be administrative and organizational rather than scholastic. Although there are undoubtedly many bright students in the special schools, the academically talented tend as a group to gravitate rather towards the regular educational system.

Considerations of political reliability exclude almost all Jews and members of minority nationalities. Women also make up an insignificant proportion of the total student body. In addition, the students in the special schools receive considerably larger stipends than their counterparts in the regular VUZes.

Finally, the special schools are an important part of selection and promotion procedures. Many of the schools provide precareer training; in many areas attendance at special schools of a higher level is often a prerequisite for further advancement.

#### *Military Schools*

The Soviet military establishment maintains its own network of educational institutions from secondary school through advanced degree training; all are subordinated to the Ministry of Defense.

At the secondary school level, the Suvorov (army) and Nakhimov (naval) schools provide preparatory training for future applicants to the officer-training schools. The curriculum includes some military training and places great emphasis on science and mathematics. Access is largely reserved to sons of officers.

At the next level are the officer-training schools (*voynnoye uchilishche*). Admission is largely by special appointment, except that graduates of the Suvorov and Nakhimov schools are admitted automatically. Those who complete the three year course are commissioned in the armed forces. Training is considered equivalent to that obtained in a specialized secondary school for the first years of higher education in the "regular" system.

At a higher level, the military academies (believed to number about 20) offer professional military training of four to six years duration which is considered fully equivalent to higher education in the regular system. Company-grade officers are eligible for admission and are almost automatically promoted to field-grade rank on graduation. At the top is the Voroshilov Higher Military Academy, a joint service academy somewhat similar to the National War College.

Unlike their Western counterparts, Soviet military academies train not only command and staff officers, but also engineers and scientists to work in military research and development. This latter training in some cases is superior to that in civilian institutes.

#### *Intelligence Schools*

The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (GRU) conducts operations against general and specific military, economic, technical, scientific, and political targets in all countries of strategic importance. It is also concerned with establishing deep cover network for future activities of a stay-behind nature, including economic or industrial sabotage, guerrilla-type operations, or other special missions. These operations call for a variety of well trained and qualified staff officers and support personnel, and the GRU maintains various schools to train officers in all aspects of clandestine operations.

The elite basic training school for officers being sent abroad under Soviet official cover is the Military Academy of the Soviet Army, more popularly known (within the GRU) as the Military-Diplomatic Academy (MDA). Almost all operational officers are recruited into the GRU by way of the MDA, and few who have not graduated from the three-year course rise above the rank of major. The MDA is an

elite institution because of its entrance requirements as well as its objectives. All of its students are graduates of an institution of higher learning, preferably a military academy. The selection committee takes into consideration a man's service record, which must be excellent, his social background, and his party record. Only commissioned officers are eligible, and most are of Great Russian nationality. Over the last several years, the classes which have entered the MDA annually have averaged about 75 students. Political courses are supplemented by area studies, language training, technical instruction peculiar to intelligence work (use of secret writing, microdots, concealment devices, etc.), and operational tradecraft (acquiring, training, and running agents, etc.).

The Military Institute of Foreign Languages (VIIYa), which is maintained by the army, provides the GRU with interpreters and translators, and many MDA students have graduated from this institute.

The GRU maintains several separate schools for training illegals—officers who go abroad under non-Soviet documentation posing as citizens of some country other than the U.S.S.R.—in addition to providing some of this training at the MDA itself. These special schools are scattered about Moscow and its suburbs.

Special technical schools of the GRU offer short courses to officers who need supplementary training in subjects such as agent communications using secret writing, microdots, high-speed radio transmitters, and similar devices. They also train specialists who will become agent instructors abroad or who will themselves use these technical means of communications.

The GRU also utilizes selected trainees from the armed services schools as support personnel. Thus cipher clerks and communications personnel (not agent communications) assigned to the GRU are usually graduates from army training schools. Typists, clerks, and logistics officers are also supplied by the armed forces.

All GRU training establishments, including the MDA, are "under cover" and are not known to the general public, not even to the non-intelligence military personnel, as intelligence training centers. Although most every military attaché abroad today has graduated from the MDA, his cover story, which details his military career and education, omits any reference to it.

Basic professional schooling in the Committee of State Security (KGB) is provided by the Higher School (also known as the KGB Institute), which combines a number of previously independent training establishments of the KGB. The largest faculty of this school is the Juridical Institute, which provides a four-year course in internal security with emphasis on legal aspects. A graduate from this faculty receives the equivalent of a degree of law, but may not overtly acknowledge receipt of a diploma unless he is separated from the KGB and requires proof of a higher education. Short courses are also offered by the Higher School. The Higher School also has a faculty of foreign languages, which was formerly the Leningrad Institute of Foreign Languages, and probably still has a three-year course for interpreters. Other faculties teach surveillance, military subjects for KGB uniformed forces, technical subjects, security and counterintelligence for Satellite personnel, and various other short courses;

Members of the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) are trained by the Higher Intelligence School of that directorate, which provides a two-year course in operational tradecraft and allied intelligence subjects. While a First Chief Directorate employee may have attended the Higher School, the Higher Intelligence School is restricted to members of the First Chief Directorate only. No diploma or academic credit is given for attendance at the Higher Intelligence School.

In addition to the Higher School and the Higher Intelligence School in Moscow, the KGB also has training institutions scattered throughout the U.S.S.R. Among them are republic KGB training facilities, which provide primarily counterintelligence instruction, and several schools, including officer candidate schools, for training KGB Border Guards personnel.

#### *Training of Personnel for Service Abroad*

The Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Trade operate schools for personnel who are to serve abroad in some capacity. The curriculum in all these institutions emphasizes area and language training rather than narrow professional training (e.g., in military subjects or diplomacy). Although these schools theoretically train personnel for the particular ministry to which they are subordinated, in actual fact the graduates may go into other ministries and organizations as needed. (To a limited extent, the area institutes under the Academy of Sciences and various universities also provide a reservoir of area specialists on which the government may draw, although in general these institutes have more of a research and academic orientation.)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs operates two schools: the Institute of International Relations and the Higher Diplomatic School. The Institute of International Relations operates a six-year program equivalent to full higher education primarily for the training of diplomatic personnel. It is open only to secondary school graduates who have shown outstanding ability in party or Komsomol work, or to outstanding students who are also completely politically reliable. A student does not apply for admission himself, but is recommended by his party or Komsomol organization. Some of the students are apparently sponsored by the military or the KGB. Reportedly many students are the children of high government and party officials. There are few women or representatives of minority nationalities.

After passing an entrance examination, a student is assigned to study a language, the selection of which depends both on his own abilities and on the government's current need for specialists in certain areas. In addition to intensive language study, the six-year curriculum includes training in the history, culture, and economics of a student's special country or area. By the time he graduates, a student will have in addition an impressive knowledge of world culture, history, international law and economics. Great emphasis is also given to political subjects—Marxism-Leninism, history of the CPSU.

In the last half of their sixth year, students are given practice work assignments related to their specialty. The large majority (70 percent) are assigned to organizations within the Soviet Union, where

they will work permanently after graduation; the rest—future diplomatic or foreign trade personnel—are assigned to embassies abroad.

After graduation, about one-fifth of the graduates are sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and ultimately assigned abroad; about one-third go to other ministries and organizations with foreign departments as interpreters or consultants. The rest are assigned, in varying proportions, to the propaganda field (journalism, radio and TV); to the military services; to the KGB; or to the Institute in a research or teaching capacity.

At a higher level the Higher Diplomatic School provides "in-service" training for diplomatic personnel. Little is known about the kind of training provided; admission is reserved largely, although not exclusively, for people already in the diplomatic services.

Little is known about the Foreign Trade School, which is operated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Its curriculum is probably similar to that in the Institute of International Relations—e.g., intensive language and area training—with more emphasis on trade and economic subjects.

The Military Institute of Foreign Languages, under the direction of the Ministry of Defense, offers a five-year course in language training for military personnel. Company-grade officers and enlisted men are eligible. In addition to language study, students also receive a certain amount of area training as well as the usual courses in Marxism-Leninism and other political subjects. Graduates are assigned to duties as military interpreters, to work in intelligence, in high government or party organizations, or to posts abroad.

#### *Party Schools*

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union operates an extensive network of schools. As reorganized in 1956, the system includes three-year middle-level "Soviet-Party" schools for training government and party workers at the village and district (rayon) level; four-year interregional higher party schools; a two-year Higher Party School in Moscow, and at the graduate level, a four-year Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee.

The interregional schools offer what is essentially "in-service" training to party officials or journalists with several years of experience in party work, who have proved themselves efficient and able, and who seem likely candidates for promotion. Applicants must be recommended for admission by the regional (oblast) or republic party committees. They must have completed secondary education and be under 35 years of age.

The bulk of the four-year course is devoted to ideological training in Marxism-Leninism, philosophy, political economy, and party history. However, since 1956, economic, managerial and technical training has been given a greatly increased share in the curriculum. This was designed to raise the technical qualifications of party cadres, but the training is in no way comparable to the training in a VUZ. At the end of four years, a student is considered to have a complete "higher party-political education" and is technically on a par with graduates of a "regular" higher educational institution.

The Higher Party School in Moscow accepts applicants who are earmarked for administrative and staff positions in the regional or republic party or government apparatus. Applicants must be

recommended for admission by the regional or republic party committee; they must in addition have completed higher education and be under 40 years of age.

The two-year program of the Higher Party School is devoted largely to further ideological training, with some emphasis on economic subjects. After it was reorganized in 1956, one of the stated purposes of the Higher Party School was to raise the ideological qualifications of the large number of technical specialists who had entered party work in recent years but who had little knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory.

The highest educational institution operated by the party is the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. The Academy offers a four-year course for the training of high-level ideologists and theoreticians. A student may write and defend a dissertation leading to the *kandidat* degree.

